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Broadly speaking, privacy doctrine suggests that the right to privacy is 
non-existent once one enters the public realm. Although some scholars 
contend that privacy ought to exist in public, “public privacy” has been 
defended largely with reference to other, ancillary values privacy may 
serve. For instance, public privacy may be necessary to make the freedom 
of association meaningful in practice. 
This Article identifies a new dimension of public privacy, supplementing 
extant justifications for the right, by arguing that many efforts to maintain 
privacy while in “public” are properly conceptualized as forms of 
performative, expressive resistance against an ever-pervasive surveillance 
society. For example, when a person wears a hoodie in public obscuring 
their identity, they may be engaged in active, expressive opposition to the 
surveillance regime — communicating a refusal to be surveilled. The same 
holds true when a person uses online obfuscation techniques to cloak their 
cyber activities. 
This Article isolates “performative privacy” as a social practice, and 
explains how this identification of public, performative privacy may 
provide doctrinal and discursive solutions to some of our most pressing 
social controversies. 
By demonstrating that functional demands for public privacy are often 
expressive, this Article helps establish that public privacy is grounded in 
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the First Amendment and covered by its robust protections. Discursively, 
directly linking public privacy performances with the well-ensconced 
freedom of expression may help shift societal reaction to such privacy 
demands from suspicion to embrace. Moreover, to the extent that acts of 
performative privacy cut across conflicts targeting racial, religious, or 
sexual minorities (regulation of hoodies, head veils, and gender identity 
are some examples), performative privacy has the potential to provide a 
more universal and unifying normative response to these conflicts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In popular discourse and in law, the right to privacy is often thought 
to cover only those activities that occur in the home, the bedroom, a 
doctor’s office, or on a personal, internet disabled computer.1 But less 
scrutinized and developed is the privacy we demand while in plain 
view — the privacy we perform in public. In fact, certain doctrines 
provide that the right to privacy while in public does not exist at all, 
that privacy is “dead” once you walk out your front door or expose 
your activities to anyone else.2 Pursuant to this conception of the right 
to privacy, privacy is synonymous with secrecy.3 But in a world of over 
seven billion people and almost constant surveillance by state and 
corporate actors,4 keeping one’s activities completely secret (and thus 
entitled to a right to privacy under the traditional, “secrecy paradigm”) 
is impossible. 
In other words, “public privacy” ought not be a contradiction in 
terms. Other scholars have rightfully begun to critique the secrecy 
paradigm and advocate for a limited right to public privacy — a right 
which would not permit unfettered government or private-party 
surveillance of one’s activities while in public.5 But by and large, 
public-privacy proponents have attempted to normatively and 
 
 1 See, e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the 
Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 913-18 (2010) (describing the home-
centric focus of Fourth Amendment protections).  
 2 See, e.g., United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 289-90 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that there is no Fourth Amendment violation where police recorded an 
individual’s activity outside his home for 10 weeks with a camera mounted on a utility 
pole by the utility company without a warrant); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of 
Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1536-37 (2000) (documenting that “privacy torts do 
not protect things in public view on the theory that such things are, by definition, not 
private”).  
 3 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 497 (2006) 
[hereinafter Taxonomy] (explaining that under the “secrecy paradigm,” a phrase 
Solove popularizes, “privacy is tantamount to complete secrecy, and a privacy 
violation occurs when concealed data is revealed to others”). 
 4 The definition of “surveillance” employed throughout this Article does not refer 
narrowly to surveillance for the purpose of government criminal investigations but, 
rather, draws from surveillance studies scholars and refers to administrative, 
bureaucratic, private, or criminal systems “that afford control of people through the 
identification, tracking, monitoring, or analysis of individuals, data, or systems.” 
TORIN MONAHAN, SURVEILLANCE IN THE TIME OF INSECURITY 8 (2010); see also DAVID 
LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 2 (2001) (defining surveillance as “any collection and 
processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of 
influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered”).  
 5 See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 142-43 
(2014) (arguing there should be “spheres of privacy in public”). 
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doctrinally justify a right to public privacy by highlighting the indirect 
support public privacy provides to other constitutional values. For 
instance, they insightfully observe that the right to leave your home 
and attend a civil rights organizing meeting without being tracked and 
surveilled is necessary for the freedom of association to have meaning 
in practice, and to prevent chilling of that right.6 
This Article bolsters existing justifications for public privacy rights 
by identifying what is, perhaps, a more direct constitutional value 
served by a right to public privacy. The Article argues that attempts to 
preserve a degree of privacy or anonymity in public are often a form of 
performative and expressive opposition to an ever expanding 
surveillance society and, as such, may be protected as symbolic 
conduct. When an individual uses encryption technology to hide their 
online communications, they are functionally maintaining their 
privacy but also signaling disavowal of widespread internet 
monitoring. When a person wears a hoodie shielding their identity, 
they may be engaged in a form of active, expressive resistance to the 
surveillance regime — lodging an objection to being surveilled. When 
a transgender person demands the right to publicly express their true 
gender identity while simultaneously invoking the right to keep 
certain details about their birth-assigned sex or genital anatomy 
obscure, they are performing the right to privacy and resisting 
administrative surveillance. When a Muslim woman wears a head, 
face, or body covering, she can be practicing her religion, but may also 
be engaged in an act of performative privacy or modesty, registering 
her refusal to be the object of social gaze. Recognizing the expressive 
value of such privacy performances links these acts to the widely-
cherished right to freedom of speech and helps us reimagine acts that 
are often viewed with distrust as part of a long history of democratic, 
political dissent — dissent that is safeguarded by the First 
Amendment. 
This Article is among the first to comprehensively identify 
performative privacy as a social phenomenon and to explore its legal 
dimensions. It does so in three Parts. 
Part I foregrounds how the solutions to many of our most pressing 
public privacy problems will not be found in traditional privacy 
doctrine, such as the Fourth Amendment.7 This Part examines and 
 
 6 E.g., Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The 
Protection of Privacy in Public Spaces, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 305, 342 (2000) (analyzing 
cases highlighting the connection between the right to public privacy and the freedom 
of association). 
 7 See infra Part I.  
  
2017] Performative Privacy 1677 
then deconstructs both the secrecy paradigm and public privacy 
theories that rely on ancillary constitutional values to justify a right to 
public privacy. While apt, there is reason to believe that such indirect 
constitutional benefits are less likely to be recognized and vindicated 
by courts because the purported harm is not palpable or immediate. 
Part II then reveals and explores examples of performative privacy, 
identifying and labeling a variety of social practices that are 
simultaneously functional efforts to maintain privacy and expressive 
forms of resistance against the scrutiny of the state and private, 
corporate actors.8 Here, I point to multiple forms of evidence for 
performative privacy. First, drawing in part on post-structural social 
theory, I explain how functional acts designed to maintain public 
privacy gain expressive texture and meaning in response to the 
structures of surveillance which pervade society.9 In other words, 
privacy efforts take on greater expressive meaning within the social 
context of surveillance. Second, I highlight evidence indicating that 
the state views functional efforts to maintain privacy as 
communicative forms of resistance, highlighting privacy’s 
performative, expressive role. In fact, in some instances the state relies 
on the very expressive nature of an effort to maintain privacy to justify 
regulation of that effort. Lastly, I point to examples where individuals 
actually identify their privacy-enhancing acts as expressive. 
Finally, Part III articulates the doctrinal and discursive payoffs, or 
implications, of performative privacy.10 Doctrinally, by demonstrating 
that demands for public privacy are often (but not always) imbued 
with expression, this Article’s concept of performative privacy helps 
establish that public privacy is grounded in the First Amendment’s 
speech protections and that existing jurisprudence provides doctrinal 
support for a right to performative privacy in public. Discursively, 
understanding functional efforts to maintain privacy as a form of 
outward-facing expression helps us appreciate that privacy is not just 
important as a pre-political incubator for political thought, as it is 
often characterized, but is, itself, directly political. Conceptualizing 
privacy in such a manner accentuates privacy’s role in maintaining the 
democratic balance between citizen and state, provides meaning to the 
currently brittle public–private distinction, and dispels misplaced 
 
 8 See infra Part II. 
 9 As used here, “post-structural” simply refers to the idea that the meaning of 
certain individual acts is partially defined by and in relation to the social structures 
surrounding them, and that deviations from the norm can begin to destabilize those 
same structures. For a much fuller discussion, see infra Part II.  
 10 See infra Part III. 
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suspicion often associated with those who demand their privacy. By 
helping society better understand the expressive dimension of 
attempts to obtain privacy in public by, for example, wearing a hoodie, 
the framework of performative privacy can help remove the initial, 
negative reaction to such a practice and instead associate it as an 
exercise of the freedom of speech — one of America’s most valued 
ideals. Moreover, the rubric of performative privacy has the potential 
to reinvigorate what we deem to be a “reasonable expectation” of 
privacy by underscoring the degree to which we do take subtle, but 
significant, efforts to guard our privacy. In these ways, performative 
privacy can shift the rhetorical landscape currently surrounding many 
attempts to obtain privacy in public. 
In addition, while certainly no substitute for identity-based claims 
against widespread structural racism, Islamophobia, and homo/
transphobia, to the extent that acts of performative privacy cut across 
laws disproportionately targeting racial, religious, or gender minorities 
(regulation of hoodies, bans on head veils, and laws that out 
transgender individuals are some examples), performative privacy 
promises to deliver a more collective and coalescing normative 
response to these conflicts. Put differently, performative privacy helps 
highlight the disparate burden of surveillance on marginalized 
communities and identifies a collective form of political resistance. 
I. DECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PRIVACY LEGAL THEORY 
Defended by a handful of scholars, privacy doctrine largely provides 
that there is no right to privacy while in public. Other scholars argue 
that to the extent a right to public privacy against unfettered 
surveillance does exist, public privacy is justified because it indirectly 
serves as an adjuvant to other constitutional values, such as the 
freedom of association or movement, or as an incubator for the 
development of ideas and then speech. This Part analyzes these two 
positions, arguing that the privacy-only-in-private notion is 
descriptively inaccurate and based on faulty assumptions regarding 
how people live their lives in practice and the privacy they expect, as 
others have also observed. It then turns to the prevailing pro-public-
privacy theories and analyzes how they are accurate and incredibly 
important, but overlook public privacy’s expressive dimension, instead 
relying on the indirect support public privacy would provide to other 
constitutional rights. 
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A. Privacy Only in Private 
Several privacy doctrines provide that once a person enters the 
public realm, any claim to privacy over that person’s activities while 
they remain in public is non-existent.11 Likewise, to the extent a 
person’s information is shared with another individual, the information 
is effectively deemed “public” and any right to privacy over that 
information that may once have existed is often extinguished. Under 
the “privacy-only-in-private” approach, the right to limit or control 
access to information subsists only to the extent the information is kept 
completely within the private realm — within the confines of one’s 
home.12 Pursuant to this notion, privacy is more or less synonymous 
with complete secrecy.13 As many have noted, this anachronistic theory 
ignores the ways in which we communicate, the ways we live our lives, 
and has little or no basis in experience or logic.14 
Nonetheless, it has found some support in scholarship and in 
several doctrinal contexts. For example, some academics have argued 
that once personal information enters the public domain, any claim to 
privacy over that information is lost.15 Under this model, simply 
 
 11 See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 121 (2012) (“Generally 
speaking, surveillance is fair game within public space, and also within spaces owned 
by third parties, but not within spaces owned by the targets of surveillance.”).  
 12 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Privacy as Struggle, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501, 504-05 
(2007) (documenting “the Court’s requirement of superhuman individual efforts to 
attain secrecy, that is, totally veiling one’s activities from the state’s prying eyes as an 
essential prerequisite to the existence of privacy, all too often at the expense of human 
relationships, interpersonal trust, and political voice”).  
 13 Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 3, at 497 (“If the information is not previously 
hidden, then no privacy interest is implicated by the collection or dissemination of the 
information. In many areas of law, this narrow view of privacy has limited the 
recognition of privacy violations.”). 
 14 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE 100-01, 108 (2011) (critiquing the 
“faulty reasoning” underlying the secrecy paradigm and observing that when one 
shares information with a friend, one does not, in fact, assume that it will be shared 
freely and widely); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed 
Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1920 (2010) (noting that “[p]eople expose information 
with varying expectations of the extent and nature of its future exposure”); Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 919 (2005) 
(observing that most people share their “most embarrassing details with other 
people”); see also Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to 
Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 347 (1983) (observing 
that “[c]ourts using the ‘location’ analysis commonly state that information 
individuals reveal about themselves in public places is by definition not private,” but 
concluding that such a test ignores the varying degrees of “public” spaces and the 
difficulty of defining what counts as “public”).  
 15 See, e.g., W. A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 
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sharing information with a close friend is enough to constitute a 
voluntary disclosure that negates privacy.16 Specifically, Heidi Reamer 
Anderson has defended a “no-privacy-in-public” regime, arguing in 
part that the pragmatic benefits of exposure of socially undesirable 
behavior outweigh any potential loss of personal dignity or loss of 
“thinking space.”17 Others have largely endorsed Fourth Amendment 
rules that limit any privacy protections against government access 
once the information at issue is transmitted to another person or 
entity.18 
Beyond scholarship, particular legal doctrines and court decisions 
suggest that any right to privacy is dramatically curtailed once a 
person or their information has entered the public realm. For example, 
in tort law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides with regard to 
the tort of publication of private facts that “there is no liability for 
giving further publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the 
public.”19 
In the Fourth Amendment criminal procedure context, the third-
party doctrine stipulates that, in certain situations, an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy evaporates once an individual shares 
the relevant information with another person, sometimes referred to as 
a so-called “third-party.”20 Correspondingly, under what has been 
 
270-71 (1983) (“What belongs to the public domain cannot without glaring paradox 
be called private; consequently it should not be incorporated within our concept of 
privacy.”).  
 16 Id. at 273.  
 17 Heidi Reamer Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic Defense of 
No Privacy in Public, 7 I/S 543, 597-98 (2012) (balancing purported benefits of no-
privacy-in-public rule with costs, and tentatively concluding that the lack of privacy in 
public is most advantageous in terms of government accountability, criminal 
deterrence, and deception prevention).  
 18 E.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 
576 (2009) (arguing that “[w]ithout the [third-party] doctrine, criminals could use 
third-party agents to fully enshroud their criminal enterprises in Fourth Amendment 
protection”).  
 19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also 
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975) (holding that there is no 
privacy violation where press published information about a rape victim that was 
already in the public domain via court records); Paton-Simpson, supra note 6, at 310-
11 (documenting that under American tort law, “[t]here is generally no liability for 
observing, following, or photographing someone in a public place,” and that 
“[p]laintiffs have been denied any right to privacy not only on the street but also in 
shops, laundromats, restaurants, health spas, parking lots, airports, common areas of 
cruise ships, and school buildings”).  
 20 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
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dubbed “assumption of the risk,” the Supreme Court has concluded 
that when individuals volunteer information to others, they are 
assuming the risk that the other party may be an informant who may 
relay the information to law enforcement.21 In such situations, the 
Court has held that no Fourth Amendment search occurred.22 
A related Fourth Amendment concept, the open fields doctrine, has 
also been used to curtail the right to privacy — even on an individual’s 
own property. The open fields doctrine provides that an individual has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy for activities conducted out-of-
doors, in fields or property not directly adjacent to the home (an area 
known as “curtilage”).23 The Supreme Court has relied on the open 
fields doctrine to hold, for example, that no warrant was required for 
police to walk past a locked gate and “No Trespassing” signs and into 
secluded property in order to investigate reports that marijuana was 
being grown.24 Interpreting the open fields doctrine on multiple 
occasions, the Supreme Court has taken a broad view of when 
privately-owned property is exposed or open to the public and thus 
entitled to minimal Fourth Amendment privacy protections.25 
 
Amendment protection.”). As Kathy Strandburg has pointed out, in certain contexts, 
the phrase “third-party doctrine” is a misnomer since not all cases involve information 
shared between more than two individuals. Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on 
the Web and other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. 
REV. 614, 652 n.201 (2011) [hereinafter Home, Home on the Web]. For a nuanced 
discussion of the third-party doctrine and the Fourth Amendment more broadly, see 
generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
611 (2015). 
 21 See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966) (finding no Fourth 
Amendment violation where Jimmy Hoffa relied “upon his misplaced confidence that 
[the informant] would not reveal [Hoffa’s] wrongdoing”); see also Taslitz, supra note 
12, at 501-02 (noting Hoffa’s “role in the growth of the ‘assumption of the risk’ 
doctrine as the primary basis for drastically limiting the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protections”).  
 22 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (confirming that “a person 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information” voluntarily shared with a 
third party); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (reiterating that 
pursuant to Hoffa, information shared with another based on the misplaced belief that 
the other party will keep it secret does not constitute a legitimate expectation of 
privacy for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment). 
 23 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-80 (1984).  
 24 Id. at 173, 177.  
 25 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989) (no warrant required for police to 
inspect predominately enclosed but partially open greenhouse within curtilage of 
home from a helicopter 400 feet above the ground, notwithstanding that greenhouse 
could not be seen into from street); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303-04 
(1987) (no warrant required for police to enter onto a 198-acre property, cross over a 
perimeter fence as well as multiple interior fences, and peer into a locked barn located 
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The Court has also held that when an individual places garbage on 
the street curb for collection, even if temporarily and opaquely 
packaged, such “public exposure” defeats any reasonable privacy 
expectation.26 A similar criminal procedure concept, the “plain view” 
doctrine, provides that police officers may seize evidence of 
contraband when visible from a lawful vantage point.27 
The theme that links the third-party doctrine, the open fields 
doctrine, the plain view doctrine, assumption of the risk, and the 
secrecy paradigm more broadly, is the underlying notion that there is 
no right to privacy in public — if information is even marginally 
exposed to others, the government and private parties are often 
permitted broad access. 
But, as others have argued, public privacy is not an oxymoron.28 
And rigid application of these doctrines ignores that individuals do, in 
fact, expect privacy when they share intimate information with a 
friend while in a public restaurant, for instance. They do not expect 
that the information will become universally accessible merely because 
they shared it within limited confines.29 With regard to physical 
 
half of a mile from the public road and in close proximity to the property’s residence); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1986) (no warrant required for aerial 
search of backyard within curtilage of home that was enclosed by 2 separate fences, 
one 6 feet tall and the other 10 feet tall); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 
227, 229, 238-39 (1986) (extending Ciraolo and permitting EPA aerial surveillance of 
outdoor area of Dow’s extensive power plant facility without a warrant despite 
“elaborate security around the perimeter of the complex”). But see Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of thermal imaging technology on 
house constitutes a search for which a warrant is required). 
 26 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-41 (1988).  
 27 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742-44 (1983) (no warrant required where 
police observed and then seized a balloon believed to contain drugs in an automobile 
that had been lawfully stopped at routine driver’s license checkpoint); cf. Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1980) (“It is . . . well settled that objects such as 
weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police without a 
warrant. The seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is 
presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the 
property with criminal activity.”). 
 28 E.g., Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law out of the Closet: A Tort Theory 
of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1044 (1995) (explaining 
that “public privacy” only sounds like an oxymoron because of the way we think of 
“public” and “privacy” in fixed, absolute terms).  
 29 Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After 
Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6 (2009) (describing how “[o]rdinary life involves 
sharing with other persons in ways that are simultaneously private and public”); Erin 
Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and 
Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1252 (2009) (arguing that the third-party doctrine 
ought to be revised to reflect that when disclosures are made in confidence, the 
  
2017] Performative Privacy 1683 
privacy, they do not expect that by dint of exiting their front door (a 
requirement of living in a society), they are providing open access to 
their movements to the government and private parties alike. 
Not only is the secrecy paradigm descriptively inaccurate from a 
behavioral standpoint, it is increasingly debilitating as privacy-
invading technologies30 expand the reach of state and private, 
corporate surveillance regimes.31 The physical and informational zone 
of what is truly secret — known to no one else — is shrinking 
dramatically.32 As such, under the “privacy-only-in-private” theory, 
the law protects very little indeed. Paradoxically, as surveillance 
regimes expand (decreasing what can functionally be kept secret), the 
right to privacy is extinguished along with it.33 Instead of serving as a 
 
government and the law should respect that confidence); Laurent Sacharoff, The 
Relational Nature of Privacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1249, 1270-71 (2012) 
(explaining that our privacy expectations exists in “widening circles” and that we 
expect more privacy from individuals with whom we are not personally close); Scott 
Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 202 (2015) [hereinafter 
Outing Privacy] (“The third-party doctrine wrongly assumes that information is either 
openly public or completely secret.”). 
 30 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of 
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by 
the advance of technology. . . . The question we confront today is what limits there are 
upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”); see also 
Paton-Simpson, supra note 6, at 321 (“A rogue factor that not only disrupts normal 
expectations of public privacy but also undermines the distinction between public and 
private places is the use of privacy-invasive technologies.”).  
 31 Of course, state and private surveillance often work hand-in-hand and are often 
far from distinct. Roy Coleman, Reclaiming the Streets: Closed Circuit Television, 
Neoliberalism and the Mystification of Social Divisions in Liverpool, UK, 2 SURVEILLANCE 
& SOC’Y 293, 296 (2004) (“For in reality there is not, and has not been, any easily 
maintained distinction between state and extra-state power, or ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
authority.”).  
 32 Reidenberg, supra note 5, at 142 (“In a world of 24/7 data tracking, 
warehousing, and mining, technology has transformed obscurity, accessibility, and 
transparency of personal information in ways that subvert the utility of the ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy’ constitutional standard.”); see Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Monitoring, Datafication, and Consent: Legal Approaches to Privacy in the Big Data 
Context, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 5, 10-11 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 
2014) (stating that datafication enhances the ability to organize information therefore 
increasing the likelihood it will be put to unintended purposes). 
 33 Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 118 (2008) (“So long as 
Fourth Amendment privacy is parasitical on private-sphere privacy, the former must 
die as its host dies, and this host is undoubtedly faltering today in the networked, 
monitored and digitized world we are learning to call our own.”); see also Crocker, 
supra note 29, at 6-7 (“If public exposure forfeits privacy protections, then how 
constitutional doctrine defines public exposure determines what aspects of ordinary 
life receive protection from government interference. What receives constitutional 
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bulwark against encroachments on privacy, the “privacy-only-in-
private” theory is defined in such a way to ensure that privacy will, in 
fact, be dead.34 And this cramped definition of privacy permits 
privacy-invading technologies and both criminal and administrative 
surveillance regimes to have free rein. 
B. Limited Privacy in Public 
Observing the conceptual and practical shortcomings of “privacy-
only-in-private” doctrines, other scholars have powerfully advocated for 
a limited right to privacy in public. These advocates for public privacy 
have begun to create limited cracks35 in the secrecy paradigm by 
emphasizing that public privacy is necessary for several other 
constitutional values to have practical effect. As noted at the outset, 
these explanations for public privacy’s importance are accurate but 
perhaps incomplete. And justifying public privacy with reliance on 
other, indirect constitutional benefits has, thus far, had limited judicial 
purchase, in part because the benefits are more tangential and harder for 
courts to discern. And then harder still for courts to weigh the indirect 
constitutional benefits against competing government interests, such as 
security and public safety.36 That is, courts are often forced to weigh 
 
protection in turn shapes the boundaries of ordinary life.”). 
 34 Cf. Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get over It’, WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999), 
http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538 (quoting Sun Microsystems 
CEO Scott McNealy as arguing that “[y]ou have zero privacy anyway” and exhorting 
society to “[g]et over it”). 
 35 E.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956-57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties” and noting the chilling threat posed to associational and 
expressive freedoms); see United States v. Lambis, No. 15-cr-734, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 90085, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2016) (ruling that third party doctrine did 
not excuse use of cell-site simulator, or StingRay, without a warrant because cellular 
data was communicated to government, not third party). But see United States v. 
Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424-25 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (ruling that third-party 
doctrine excuses collection of cell-site location data from warrant requirement because 
the criminal suspect exposed the data to cell phone service provider); United States v. 
Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 289-90 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that a police video recording 
of person’s activities outside their home for ten weeks did not require a warrant).  
 36 See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1972) (ruling that purported injury 
from chilling effect of Army surveillance of civil political activity was too attenuated to 
even support plaintiff’s standing to bring suit); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press 
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1051-52 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Yet not every 
Government action that has an inhibiting or constrictive impact on First Amendment 
activity is said therefore to have an impermissible ‘chilling effect.’”); see also Skinner-
Thompson, Outing Privacy, supra note 29, at 173 (collecting cases and arguing that, at 
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privacy concerns against concerns over safety and security, and if 
privacy’s importance is limited to indirectly creating space for the 
exercise of other constitutional values, it will often lose out.37 
In both criminal procedure and tort law, public-privacy proponents 
have emphasized public privacy’s ability to indirectly prevent chilling 
of constitutionally protected activity, such as association or speech. 
For example, in the tort context, scholars have critiqued tort law’s 
stubborn adherence to the no-privacy-in-public paradigm, and rightly 
observed that such a rule “is flawed in a modern technological society 
where the video camcorder has become a permanent fixture.”38 In 
making the case for a limited tort of “public intrusion” where the 
plaintiff has taken actions that manifest their desire for privacy in 
public, Andrew McClurg emphasizes the chilling effect that being 
observed while in public can have on behavior.39 Elizabeth Paton-
Simpson has advocated similarly for privacy tort protections even 
while in public, stressing how a right to privacy in public would give 
life to the freedom of association. Paton-Simpson observes, as an 
example, how surveillance of individuals who attend a union meeting 
chills the constitutionally protected ability to associate and organize.40 
Similar instrumental justifications for public privacy are offered in 
the criminal procedure/Fourth Amendment context. For example, 
scholars have documented that the Olmstead/Katz “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test, which dictates that no search implicating 
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement occurs if a person does 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or item 
searched, has been interpreted to give undue primacy to the home as 
the space where we expect privacy.41 As Marc Blitz advocates, courts 
 
least in the context of informational privacy, courts struggle when there are “too many 
causal steps” between the privacy violation and the purported harm).  
 37 As discussed more fully in Parts II and III, this Article’s identification and 
promotion of “performative privacy” supplements existing normative justifications for 
public privacy by directly linking demands for public privacy with the First 
Amendment’s robust protections for expressive conduct. See infra Parts II–III. 
Arguably, suggesting that efforts to maintain privacy are expressive is still an appeal to 
an “indirect” value, but by highlighting that the act of privacy is, in itself, expressive, 
the distance between the privacy effort and the constitutional harm is tightened.  
 38 E.g., McClurg, supra note 28, at 990-91. 
 39 Id. at 1035-36.  
 40 Paton-Simpson, supra note 6, at 342. Paton-Simpson also astutely notes that a 
system without public privacy affords more protection to the affluent, who can afford 
to build higher walls — both literal and technological — to keep surveillance regimes 
at bay. Id. at 343.  
 41 See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public 
Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. 
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should give more attention to the privacy architecture that exists 
within public space and should protect the “public” enclaves that 
provide refuge for individual freedom (for example, the freedom one 
can find in public by putting distance or barriers between others and 
one’s activities).42 But Blitz, too, normatively justifies the right to 
public privacy with reference to the instrumental benefits it provides, 
i.e., because public privacy enables people the “freedom to reinvent 
themselves.”43 
Likewise, Christopher Slobogin has explained that the Fourth 
Amendment ought to apply to government efforts to surveil public 
activity and that while a warrant may not be required, the government 
nevertheless is obliged to justify its use of public surveillance.44 To 
Slobogin, public anonymity is important because it helps assure the 
freedom of movement and gives meaning to the freedoms of 
association and speech.45 Without some degree of public privacy or 
anonymity, anonymous speech and the ability to organize in secret 
would be chilled.46 Other scholars have rightly extended that 
 
L. REV. 1349, 1363-65 (2004) (arguing that the Katz framework set out the home as 
one of the prime protected spaces).  
 42 Id. at 1415, 1444.  
 43 Id. at 1480-81. Andrew Ferguson has also recently argued that there ought to be 
Fourth Amendment protections against government surveillance while in public, 
advancing a concept called “personal curtilage.” Under Ferguson’s personal curtilage 
conception, which is arguably consistent with this Article’s concept of performative 
privacy, individuals can gain freedom from government surveillance while in public 
by “affirmatively act[ing] to mark out the area of security.” Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, 
Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment Security in Public, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1283, 
1287-92 (2014).  
 44 Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and 
the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 312-14 (2002).  
 45 Id. at 252-58. 
 46 Id. at 253; see also Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 153-55 (2007) (suggesting that the First Amendment ought to 
limit government information gathering when there is an indirect chilling effect on 
communications or associations that “implicate belief, discourse, or relationships of a 
political, cultural, or religious nature”). Joel Reidenberg, too, has argued that a limited 
right to be free from government surveillance while in public is necessary because 
“constitutional democracy depends on spheres of privacy in public to preserve public 
safety and fair governance.” Reidenberg, supra note 5, at 143. Reidenberg suggests that 
acts which occur in public but have no bearing on democratic governance (such as a 
phone call to a friend from a payphone) are entitled to public privacy, while acts 
which are directed at the government (such as a protest) are not entitled to public 
privacy. Id. at 155-57. 
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argument,47 explaining how surveillance of our networked activities, 
not just our physical activities, chills the freedom to associate.48 
On a broader, conceptual level, Helen Nissenbaum has critiqued the 
public–private divide that has dominated philosophical theories of 
privacy because that divide obscures that public surveillance injures 
the values associated with privacy in the same ways that intrusions 
into our intimate affairs may.49 For Nissenbaum, the values served by 
public privacy “are wide-ranging, including individual values such as 
autonomy, liberty, individuality, capacity to form and maintain 
intimate relations, mental health, creativity, personal growth, as well 
as social values such as a free and democratic society.”50 While not 
focused exclusively on the question of public privacy, others have also 
 
 47 See Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational Freedom 
in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 590 (2014) (explaining that 
“historical and recent government surveillance chills associational freedom” and that 
“data aggravates that problem”); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a 
Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 
741, 747-48 (2008) (arguing compellingly that surveillance of networked 
relationships ought to be viewed as implicating the freedom to associate and be 
subject to First Amendment strict scrutiny); Katherine J. Strandburg, Membership 
Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of Association’s Specificity Requirement, 10 I/S 327, 356-65 
(2014) (extending freedom of association’s protection to NSA’s telephony metadata 
program).  
 48 Even in contexts less historically associated with privacy law, such as 
intellectual property, public privacy has often been promoted on the basis of its 
indirect, instrumental benefits. See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 
CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 297, 301 (2003) (arguing that extensive surveillance for 
the purpose of detecting piracy online has the potential to chill both legitimate and 
illegitimate creative development).  
 49 Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of 
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559, 569-70 (1998) [hereinafter Protecting Privacy]. 
Similarly, in the information privacy context, Ari Waldman has powerfully explained 
how viewing privacy law as protecting relationships of trust will better capture when 
information should be entitled to protection than the faulty public–private divide. Ari 
Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked World, 
69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 561-64 (2015).  
 50 Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy, supra note 49, at 593; see also Frank Rudy 
Cooper, Surveillance and Identity Performance: Some Thoughts Inspired by Martin Luther 
King, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 537-38 (2008) (explaining that 
“surveillance has the power to prevent people from performing their identities as they 
would see fit” through “means of pressuring them to adhere to preexisting cultural 
norms”); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2013) (suggesting that obscurity while engaged on the “public” 
internet is important to protect individuals from being pressured to conform to social 
norms).  
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noted privacy’s role in creating space for the development of political 
thought.51 
These critiques of the secrecy paradigm and the ways in which it has 
manifested itself across many areas of substantive law are apt, and they 
have helped open certain courts’ eyes to public privacy’s potential.52 
But, by and large, the development of a right to public privacy has 
been slow in coming and many doctrines maintain their dogged 
commitment to the secrecy paradigm.53 
It seems possible that the sluggishness with which the purported 
right to public privacy has manifested itself in doctrine is in part 
because it has been justified on the same instrumental terms and with 
the same values that the right to privacy writ large has been (with 
mixed success) defended. For example, as discussed above, some have 
attempted to draw a direct parallel between the norms underlying 
public privacy and the norms underlying privacy into our personal 
affairs.54 But defending the right to privacy in courts with reference to 
amorphous values (such as dignity or autonomy) has by many 
accounts been a failed exercise.55 
Perhaps more to the point, justifying the right to be free from public 
surveillance by, for example, closed-circuit television networks, by 
 
 51 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 
(2013) (“[F]reedom from surveillance, whether public or private, is foundational to 
the practice of informed and reflective citizenship.”); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual 
Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 408-25 (2008) (outlining the connection between 
intellectual privacy and freedom of thought); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of 
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1945-46 (2013) [hereinafter Dangers] (arguing 
“that new ideas often develop best away from the intense scrutiny of public exposure” 
and “that a meaningful guarantee of privacy — protection from surveillance or 
interference — is necessary to promote this kind of intellectual freedom”); cf. JAMES C. 
SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS xii (1990) 
[hereinafter DOMINATION] (documenting how subordinate groups create a “‘hidden 
transcript’ that represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the 
dominant”). 
 52 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954-57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (arguing the third-party doctrine is ill-suited for today’s society and 
technology, and noting that other constitutional liberties are at play). 
 53 See supra Part I.A.  
 54 E.g., Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy, supra note 49, at 569-70.  
 55 See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 10, 108 (2010) (suggesting 
that reliance on “higher-order values” to justify privacy often fails to resolve conflicts 
between privacy and other interests); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 233, 234 (1977) (“A legal concept will do us little good if it expands like a 
gas to fill up the available space.”); see also JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR 7 
(2001) (documenting the shortcomings of privacy-centric approaches to combatting 
widespread administrative surveillance).  
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relying on indirect concerns about “chilling” the freedom to meet and 
associate requires courts to take more causal steps than may be 
necessary in order to normatively and doctrinally justify a right to 
public privacy.56 It frames privacy as a tool used to harness other 
values and rights, rather than emphasizing privacy’s inherent, and 
more potent, power.57 
As demonstrated below, conceptualizing efforts to maintain privacy 
in public as expressive, performative acts highlights a more direct 
dimension and value of public privacy and ties it more directly to the 
freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.58 Such a 
framing may not only have doctrinal benefits, but may also have 
meaningful discursive, societal effects, elevating our understanding of 
privacy’s value. 
II. REVEALING PERFORMATIVE PRIVACY 
Individuals’ efforts to maintain privacy, anonymity, or obscurity 
while simultaneously engaged in public activity ought to be 
understood as performative, expressive acts — expressions that may 
often be protected directly by the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.59 Certainly, as outlined in Part I.B, maintaining 
anonymity while in public by wearing a hoodie or using internet 
obfuscation technology instrumentally aids one’s freedom of 
movement or freedom to associate without being detected by public 
surveillance. But it is more than that. As government and corporate 
surveillance of both our physical and cyber activities becomes 
ubiquitous, efforts taken to shield activities from surveillance are not 
always just a means to an end — a means to effectuate other 
constitutional values. Instead, they are often a direct statement of 
 
 56 See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1972) (chilling effect from surveillance 
was too indirect); cf. Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, supra note 29, at 173. 
 57 See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422-23 
(1980) (arguing that once privacy is explicitly defended on its own merits, instead of 
justified in terms of other, ancillary rights, it would gain validation).  
 58 Judith Wagner DeCew’s version of what she labels “expressive privacy” is quite 
different from what I identify as performative, expressive privacy. For DeCew, 
expressive privacy is more akin to the instrumental concept of intellectual privacy. See 
supra note 51. That is, under DeCew’s formulation, “privacy protects a realm for 
expressing one’s self-identity or personhood through speech or activity.” JUDITH 
WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY 77 (1997). But for DeCew, the functional 
demand for privacy does not appear to be, in and of itself, outwardly expressive. Id. 
 59 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble . . . .”). 
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resistance to the pervasive surveillance regimes. In such instances, 
they are entitled to First Amendment protections from government 
infringement. 
This Part demonstrates how “performative privacy” is conceptually 
coherent and descriptively accurate, and does the work of identifying 
and labeling examples of performative privacy. Evidence that 
functional efforts to maintain privacy in public are also expressive 
comes in three principal forms: (1) the state’s regulatory reaction to 
functional efforts to maintain privacy, (2) individuals’ self-
identification of such acts as expressive, and (3) post-structural social 
theory, which elevates social context as a backdrop that helps make 
individuals’ actions intelligible. After outlining the post-structural 
theoretical foundations for performative privacy, this Part analyzes 
several real-world examples of performative privacy. 
In Part III, the Article explains how conceptualizing public privacy 
demands as expressive will help such demands find doctrinal 
protection and protection in the court of public opinion. 
A. Performative Privacy in Theory 
This Article’s thesis — that functional efforts to maintain privacy 
can also serve as expressive forms of resistance to surveillance 
structures — is supported by, and in turn extends, post-structural 
theory. The post-structural concept of performative privacy serves to 
highlight the degree to which we, as individuals, are being observed, 
operated on, and controlled by surveillance systems, and at the same 
time helps label a form of resistance — and one with doctrinal footing. 
Put differently, the concept of performativity as applied to privacy can 
help expose the extent to which individuals are subjects of 
surveillance structures, and simultaneously reveals methods for 
maintaining democratic agency and points of resistance within those 
surveillance networks.60 That is to say, “performative privacy” helps us 
understand the scope of privacy problems and identify potential 
solutions. 
Political theorist Judith Butler first articulated the contemporary 
post-structural concept of performativity while scrutinizing prevailing, 
 
 60 See JOHN E. MCGRATH, LOVING BIG BROTHER 16 (2004) (arguing that agency can 
be achieved by mocking surveillance, even if the agency is “never fully volitional,” but 
focusing on efforts to ape surveillance, rather than efforts to perform privacy and 
avoid identification); cf. Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A Counter-Narrative 
of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1596-98 (2015) (discussing 
principled resistance through the assertion of individual rights as a form of political 
participation critical to checking state power).  
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heteronormative conceptions of gender and sex.61 Butler explained 
that social performances of gender, rather than expressing anything 
innate, ingrained, essential, or “true” about what it meant to be male 
or female, were often mere reflections of the dominant social 
constructions and conceptions of a particular gender. In Butler’s 
words, “the anticipation conjures its object . . . the anticipation of a 
gendered essence produces that which it posits as outside itself.”62 
While Butler suggested that we were all, in essence, performing and 
reproducing socially-inscribed notions of gender, she also explained 
that both subconscious and self-conscious performances that 
challenged prevailing norms, for example, through drag, could 
“expose the tenuousness of gender ‘reality.’”63 Drawing from Michel 
Foucault, Butler explained that rather than remaining a passive 
medium reflecting dominant norms, the body could be transformed 
into an expressive site of resistance.64 And the expressive value of non-
normative gender performances was amplified precisely because of the 
dominant structures of heteronormativity — that is, gender 
performances that deviated from the norm were imbued with agency 
and expressive meaning in part because of their oppositional 
positioning to hegemonic social expectations.65 
But the pertinence of performativity is not limited to gender politics. 
As another example, in her more recent work, Butler extends the 
theory of gender performance to the plural performativity of social 
movements engaged in acts of public assembly. By physically 
occupying contested public space, public gatherings communicate and 
 
 61 See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (2006) (exploring the theory of 
gender performativity). While luminary, Butler’s development of performativity built 
on related concepts first identified by Michel Foucault, J.L. Austin, Erving Goffman, 
and others. See, e.g., J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 6-7 (1962) 
(explaining that certain utterances are performative in that they perform an action, or 
speech act). 
 62 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 61, at xv; cf. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU 
GULATI, ACTING WHITE? 94 (2013) (“Grooming requirements such as makeup for 
women and short hair for men help to constitute gender. They shape what it means to 
be a man and what it means to be a woman.”); Clare Huntington, Staging the Family, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 611-14 (2013) (arguing that family roles are performed and 
that such performances have a “communicative effect, on others and the self” such 
that they “construct familial categories and create social meaning”). 
 63 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 61, at xxv.  
 64 See id. at 175-78.  
 65 As explained by David Hoy in his book on critical resistance, “[t]he particular 
social structure provides the grid of intelligibility for making sense of the actions as 
conforming to or dissenting from the given power configuration.” DAVID COUZENS 
HOY, CRITICAL RESISTANCE 3 (2004).  
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signify a message “prior to, and apart from, any particular demands 
they make.”66 That message is one which calls “into question the 
inchoate and powerful dimensions of reigning notions of the 
political.”67 In other words, the embodied plural performances of 
public assemblies question whether the body politic is being served by 
prevailing democratic governance. For Butler, public assemblies 
perform an “expressive and signifying function” demanding more 
livable political and economic conditions.68 
In short, a post-structural theory of performative politics posits at 
least four things: (1) social performances conjure and re-inscribe 
normative identities and values; (2) actions (whether they be public 
assembly, drag, or, as I suggest, privacy demands) that deviate from 
prevailing performances can be expressive forms of resistance separate 
and apart from any linguistic utterance that may (or may not) 
accompany them; (3) these actions’ expressive value is derived, at least 
in part, from the fact that they are deviating from prevailing social 
performances; and (4) the deviant actions’ expressive power is so great 
that it can begin to erode, dismantle, or recraft the social structures to 
which they are responding. 
 
 66 JUDITH BUTLER, NOTES TOWARDS A PERFORMATIVE THEORY OF ASSEMBLY 8 (2015) 
[hereinafter ASSEMBLY]; cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, Political Disobedience, in OCCUPY: 
THREE INQUIRIES IN DISOBEDIENCE 45, 53 (Mitchell et al. eds., 2013) (“The [Occupy] 
resistance movement can only be ‘heard,’ syntactically, from its place of 
occupation . . . .”).  
 67 BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note 66, at 9.  
 68 Id. at 11. In a complementary vein, Camille Gear Rich has powerfully explained 
that “part of the process of constituting oneself as a social actor requires the 
acceptance and recognition of racial/ethnic codes and markings and the mobilization 
of these codes to ensure that other actors read them in the manner that ensures one is 
placed in the desired race or ethnic group.” Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and 
Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1134, 1178 (2004). That is, crafting one’s social identity involves an expressive 
performance that feeds off of, and helps shape, social norms/structures. Similarly, as 
recently documented by Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, dominant, white workplace 
culture within the United States causes individuals to work their identities — that is, 
they either conform to the prevailing social norms and structures and attempt to 
“pass,” or resist such structures through non-conformance. Efforts to work one’s 
identity are clearly communicative and involve what Gulati and Carbado label 
“signaling strategies.” CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 62, at 23-26; see also Kenji 
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 780-81 (2002) (documenting how people play 
down aspects of their identities in different contexts, and are sometimes encouraged to 
do so by the law); cf. John Gilliom, Struggling with Surveillance: Resistance, 
Consciousness, and Identity, in THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE & VISIBILITY 111, 
114 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson eds., 2006) [hereinafter Struggling with 
Surveillance] (emphasizing the importance of understanding surveillance resistance as 
occurring within a structural context of networked surveillance technologies).  
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Put in context, when men engage in sodomy, they express a 
challenge to gender norms and create new, less violent and less 
restrictive norms; when people gather in Zuccotti Park, they contest 
neoliberal political governance and suggest that there are different 
ways to conceive of participatory democracy; and, as I will show, 
when individuals attempt to maintain privacy while in public, they 
express resistance to surveillance regimes and also help shape 
community norms regarding privacy as a valuable social good and 
help redraw the line separating public from private.69 
This theory of performative privacy draws additional support from 
the work of Jean Baudrillard, who explained that while objects often 
have a functional value — the instrumental purpose for which the 
object is used — they also have symbolic and sign value relative to 
other objects and to people within a system of objects.70 According to 
Baudrillard, objects signify certain messages and the content of that 
message is partially determined based on an object’s relationship to 
other objects, and the people who use or display the object(s).71 He 
labeled this system a “signifying fabric.”72 
Here, I am addressing the signifying effects of privacy efforts within 
the social fabric of widespread surveillance. The extent to which the 
surveillance regime has penetrated our lives is vividly conveyed by 
 
 69 Cf. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 61, at xxiv (“[N]o political revolution 
is possible without a radical shift in one’s notion of the possible and the real.”); 
TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 69 (2015) (“[T]he struggle, in and of 
itself, has meaning.”). 
 70 JEAN BAUDRILLARD, FOR A CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SIGN 29 
(Charles Levin trans., 1981) (arguing that an object’s sign value is often more 
important and valuable than its pragmatic, functional value); JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE 
SYSTEM OF OBJECTS 4 (James Benedict trans., 1996) [hereinafter THE SYSTEM OF 
OBJECTS] (isolating for study a “‘spoken’ system of objects — that is, the study of the 
more or less consistent meanings that objects institute”).  
 71 BAUDRILLARD, THE SYSTEM OF OBJECTS, supra note 70, at 200 (explaining that an 
object “derives its consistency, and hence its meaning, from an abstract and systematic 
relationship to all other sign-objects”).  
 72 Id. Indeed, to the extent that sociologists have often recognized that criminal 
punishment serves an expressive function — expressing the conscience collective of 
the community/state — it is no great leap to suggest that functional efforts to resist 
surveillance, discipline, and punishment are also expressive. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, 
PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 68 (1990) (explaining that the penal process is “a 
means of evoking, expressing, and modifying passions, as well as an instrumental 
procedure for administering offenders”). As others have noted, surveillance systems 
are not neutral or a-political, but instead communicate and create normative, often 
neoliberal, messages. See, e.g., Kirstie Ball et al., Big Data Surveillance and the Body-
Subject, 22 BODY & SOC’Y 58, 70-71 (2016) (“[S]urveillance communicates value 
systems to the surveilled.”); Coleman, supra note 31, at 299-300.  
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Bernard Harcourt — “ordinary life is uncannily converging with 
practices of punishment: The see-throughness of our digital lives 
mirrors the all-seeingness of the penal sphere.”73 Put another way, 
“the infrastructure, by default, gathers data on you.”74 As surveillance 
scholars have observed, “[i]n many respects surveillance is 
constitutive of modern society.”75 That is, surveillance in its varied 
forms (administrative, technological, and penal) is pervasive and 
dramatically shapes and restricts behavior, a point richly highlighted 
by Julie Cohen, who argues that privacy theorists should abandon 
notions of selfhood cultivated purely through solitary development.76 
According to Cohen, surveillance regimes impact and alter the 
development of both space and individual identity, which are 
intimately linked.77 
 
 73 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED 21 (2015). As Harcourt and others have noted, 
society is now organized or structured in such a way that we willingly surrender or 
volunteer many aspects of our privacy in exchange for the mere opportunity to 
participate, or live, in society. Id. at 15; see, e.g., Ball, et al., supra note 72, at 64 
(explaining that big data succeeds “by co-opting individuals into de facto surveillance 
of their own private lives”).  
 74 FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION 49-50 (2015); cf. STEVEN 
LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 21-22 (1974) (explaining that social structures are 
maintained not just by control over individual acts, “but also, most importantly, by 
the socially structured and culturally patterned behavior of groups, and practices of 
institutions, which may indeed be manifested in individuals’ inaction”).  
 75 E.g., Aaron K. Martin et al., Understanding Resistance to Digital Surveillance: 
Towards a Multi-Disciplinary, Multi-Actor Framework, 6 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 213, 
216 (2009).  
 76 COHEN, supra note 11, at 129-30; see also id. at 140 (“Like identities, places are 
dynamic and relational; they are constructed over time through everyday practice.”). 
 77 See id. at 141 (“Transparency alters the parameters of evolving subjectivity by 
imposing normalizing categories and distinctions; exposure alters the capacity of 
places to function as contexts within which identity is developed and performed.”). 
While Julie Cohen’s dismantling of networked surveillance is crucial, she seems to 
stop short of analyzing the implications of her critique for resistance efforts. In fact, at 
times, she appears skeptical of efforts to resist the normalizing and retarding effects of 
surveillance (efforts she calls “self-defense”) because, according to Cohen, they occur 
at the individual level and a collective response is needed. Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, 
Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 199-201 (2008). 
Although I agree that collective responses are desirable, it is not clear to me why acts 
of performative privacy cannot be group based. But more significantly, the back-and-
forth development/dialogue between social structures and individual play (that Cohen 
helps identify) is precisely why efforts to performatively resist can have such an 
impact — the efforts can help shape norms, expectations, and laws. See David J. 
Phillips, From Privacy to Visibility, 23 SOC. TEXT 95, 95 (2005) (“The ability to present 
the self [and, I would add, conceal the self], and to make moral claims about how one 
is to be perceived and acted toward, is a fundamental mechanism for structuring social 
relations and for asserting social power.”). 
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Into this (in some ways self-inflicted) Panopticon step efforts to 
maintain privacy while in public. I argue that such efforts are often a 
form of performative, expressive resistance to the surveillance regimes 
— that they communicate and signal opprobrium of surveillance, 
shine a critical spotlight on that surveillance,78 and by so doing, offer a 
reimagined place for privacy in our social structures.79 As with acts of 
public assembly, “some matter of political significance is being 
enacted and conveyed” by functional efforts to maintain (or take back) 
privacy.80 Performative privacy as a dimension of public privacy has 
the potential to subvert the reality that a surveilled individual “is the 
object of information, never a subject in communication.”81 The 
concept of performative privacy highlights that by mitigating the 
surveillance, one can be transformed from object into communicator.82 
In the next subpart, I analyze several efforts to maintain privacy in 
order to demonstrate that the theory of performative privacy is 
descriptively accurate — that is, that it is more just a theory, but a 
lived reality. In the final Part, I outline the various implications for 
this Article’s theory of performative privacy. 
B. Performative Privacy in Practice 
Even before Edward Snowden revealed details regarding the 
National Security Agency’s efforts to surveil the American public 
through sophisticated metadata programs, the extent to which our 
every digital and physical fingerprint was observed, recorded, 
 
 78 Because “power functions more effectively the less visible it is,” acts of 
performative privacy draw out exercises of state power from behind their cameras and 
force the use of more direct forms of power, thereby exposing power structures. HOY, 
supra note 65, at 83. 
 79 Cf. SCOTT, DOMINATION, supra note 51, at 196 (“So long as the elite treat such 
assaults on their dignity as tantamount to open rebellion, symbolic defiance and 
rebellion do amount to the same thing.”); MCGRATH, supra note 60, at 218-19 
(arguing that surveillance performance critiques help us comprehend responses to 
surveilled space).  
 80 See BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note, 66, at 22.  
 81 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 200 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977); 
cf. Mimi Thi Nguyen, The Hoodie as Sign, Screen, Expectation, and Force, 40 SIGNS 791, 
813 (2015) (“To be an object is to be determined by another . . . .”).  
 82 As Hille Koskela has explained, “[s]pace can feel oppressive: ‘like an enemy 
itself,’ but reclaiming space can — at the same time — be the precondition of 
emancipation.” Hille Koskela, ‘The Gaze Without Eyes’: Video-Surveillance and the 
Changing Nature of Urban Space, 24 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 243, 259 (2000) 
(citation omitted). Performative privacy embellishes Koskela’s point by underscoring 
how reclaiming space through efforts to maintain privacy is directly emancipatory, 
directly expressive, and not merely a precondition for freedom.  
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aggregated, and scrutinized was relatively well-documented.83 Indeed, 
the use of surveillance as a tool for social control is quite old.84 In the 
face of that surveillance, individuals and groups have attempted to 
obscure their identities and activities in public.85 
Other scholars, such as Elizabeth Joh, John Gilliom, and Ryan Calo 
have documented some of the ways in which individuals resist 
surveillance in diverse contexts, and begun to investigate the 
importance of these acts.86 As Joh has explained, efforts to obscure are 
often not a means of hiding criminal activity (frequently there is no 
criminal activity), but instead merely an effort to express protest — to 
communicate to the state that they could not and should not 
observe.87 However, for Joh, the value of privacy protests appears 
limited to (1) highlighting whether a particular form of surveillance is 
necessary and (2) demonstrating shifting privacy norms; that is, that 
 
 83 See, e.g., NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY vii (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman 
eds., 1971) (“The products of modern technology and some of the direct and indirect 
effects of mass society combine to enhance [privacy’s] scarcity value.”); Froomkin, 
supra note 2, at 1468-501 (cataloguing privacy-invading technologies); Strandburg, 
Home, Home on the Web, supra note 20, at 626 (arguing that technology threatens 
privacy by enhancing the methods for invading traditionally private areas, and by 
creating more opportunities for intrusion through “technology-mediated social” 
interactions); cf. HARCOURT, supra note 73, at 7 (arguing that social media has become 
a surveillance dragnet). 
 84 See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 81, at 200-01 (observing the ways in which the 
state disciplines and controls populations through surveillance).  
 85 See, e.g., GILLIOM, supra note 55, at 6 (documenting how those receiving welfare 
and subject to its surveillance “build a critique of surveillance that is based in the 
realities and demands of everyday life”); Gilliom, Struggling with Surveillance, supra 
note 68, at 113 (observing that there is “a widespread pattern of unconventional 
politics through which ordinary people can express and mobilize their opposition to 
surveillance policies while at the same time achieving short-term gains that are 
important in their daily lives” and listing as examples obscuring one’s license plate 
with mud and using false names for supermarket frequent shopper programs); 
Virginia Eubanks, Want to Predict the Future of Surveillance? Ask Poor Communities, 
AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 15, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/want-predict-future-
surveillance-ask-poor-communities (“Resistance to surveillance is as common as 
surveillance itself.”).  
 86 See GILLIOM, supra note 55, at 6; Ryan Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveillance?, 
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 23, 30-31 (2016); Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance 
Evasion and Fourth Amendment Suspicion, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 997, 1000-02 (2013); see 
also Finn Brunton & Helen Nissenbaum, Vernacular Resistance to Data Collection and 
Analysis: A Political Theory of Obfuscation, FIRST MONDAY (May 2, 2011), http://www. 
firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3493/2955 (documenting the practice 
of obfuscation as a form of resistance against data collection whereby individuals 
deliberating create false data to confuse or delay data collectors).  
 87 Joh, supra note 86, at 1002. 
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people do expect privacy.88 Joh’s focus appears limited to the Fourth 
Amendment, and she downplays any First Amendment role in 
protecting privacy protests.89 
Here, I add to existing discussions regarding surveillance resistance 
not only by identifying and connecting additional examples of such 
resistance, but more importantly by situating these examples within 
performative, post-structural theory, which, in turn, helps uncover 
privacy’s expressive dimension. In other words, part of my 
contribution is in demonstrating that there is expressive power in 
maintaining one’s anonymity or privacy against an ever-watching 
surveillance regime, and highlighting the social impact of those 
privacy performances. 
Examples of such performative privacy are not uncommon and I 
explore four of them in detail. These real world examples buttress the 
theoretical account provided in the preceding Section, and vice versa. 
Importantly, these examples do not necessarily illustrate performative 
privacy in exactly the same ways. That is, there are variations in how 
functional demands for privacy serve as acts of performative 
expression. But rather than detracting from this Article’s theory of 
performative privacy, the subtle differences in the way performative 
privacy operates in the context of hoodies, cyber masks, gender 
expression, and head veils helps highlight the concept’s potency and 
potential breadth. 
Nor am I suggesting that all people who engage in functional efforts 
to maintain public privacy are enacting an expressive message at all 
times. People can seek privacy for lots of reasons. But this Article’s 
purpose is to show how those functional acts are frequently 
expressive. 
1. Hoodies 
The hoodie has evolved from a functional apparel item to an iconic 
symbol of resistance that simultaneously obscures one’s unique 
identity. The hoodie, by providing a level of privacy while in public, is 
increasingly worn as an expression of resistance against the 
 
 88 Id. at 1022-23. 
 89 Id. at 1005 n.38; see id. at 1023. Similarly, while Ryan Calo has noted the 
importance of citizen resistance to surveillance, he does not appear sanguine about the 
prospect of legal protections for that resistance. Calo, supra note 86, at 36-39. Nor 
does Gilliom meaningfully explore doctrinal protections for the resistance he so 
importantly documents. See GILLIOM, supra note 55, at 6-7.  
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government. A brief history helps illustrate the hoodie’s expressive 
pedigree and current performative role.90 
In the 1970s, the hoodie was worn by graffiti artists to help them 
“keep a low profile” while engaged in graffiti.91 The hoodie was 
subsequently adopted by hip-hop, skate, and punk cultures — 
cultures that shared perhaps reciprocal antipathy with mainstream 
society. As such, “the hoodie was further interwoven with a culture of 
defiance.”92 As this history suggests, the hoodie has often been worn 
by individuals engaged in expressive mediums (e.g., graffiti, music).93 
Over time, the hoodie’s ability to cloak individuals became 
expressive in and of itself as a sign of resistance. As author and poet 
Jarrett Neal articulated in his collection What Color is Your Hoodie, 
“[a]t various times in our lives we all cloak ourselves in the same 
metaphorical hoodie whether the forces of our inequitable society 
impose it upon us or we conceal ourselves in it of our own free will, 
an act of rebellion or survival.”94 In addition to this descriptive 
 
 90 As noted, this is not to say everyone who wears a hoodie is engaged in an act of 
expressive resistance. People wear hoodies for myriad reasons (warmth, comfort, etc.). 
But the hoodie is sometimes worn as a form of surveillance resistance. And even in 
instances where not worn for that purpose, it may be understood by the state and other 
surveilling actors as a form of resistance — highlighting its expressive role and, as will 
be outlined in Part III, the arguable invalidity of attempts to target, strip, and 
criminalize efforts to conceal oneself in public. See ALISON KINNEY, HOOD 7 (2016) 
(explaining that everyone wears hoods, but hoods nonetheless provoke responses, 
including legislative responses). More broadly, as surveillance scholar Kirstie Ball has 
observed, particularly in a world of big data, individuals may not be fully conscious of 
interacting with particular surveillance practices and, yet, their information is 
gathered and their bodies are read. Ball, supra note 72, at 67; cf. MCGRATH, supra note 
60, at 100 (explaining that certain people may be unaware of the perlocutionary or 
performative effects of an act, does not negate those performative effects). As such 
(and important for the First Amendment analysis), the valence of a specific intent to 
express resistance at a particular point seems diminished. An internalized or 
routinized form of resistance may be more effective, and speak more loudly, than any 
self-conscious effort. Cf. HOY, supra note 65, at 10-11 (explaining that for many 
critical theorists, “although resistance should not be blind, agents need not know 
explicitly all their reasons and principles in advance”).  
 91 Denis Wilson, The History of the Hoodie, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 3, 2012), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-history-of-the-hoodie-20120403.  
 92 Id.  
 93 Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music is one of 
the oldest forms of human expression.”); Margaret L. Mettler, Note, Graffiti Museum: 
A First Amendment Argument for Protecting Uncommissioned Art on Private Property, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 249, 249-51 (2012) (documenting graffiti’s expressive function).  
 94 JARRETT NEAL, WHAT COLOR IS YOUR HOODIE? 163 (2015). Neal goes on to 
describe how a hoodie can signify the “halo of an avenging angel,” the “cape of a 
superhero,” or the “mythic cloak of invisibility.” Id. at 165. Similarly, in his recent 
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account, an empirical study of students at three British schools 
revealed that some students would actively resist CCTV surveillance 
cameras by putting up their hoods to avoid detection.95 
And it is in part because the hoodie is a functional and yet 
expressive form of resistance to surveillance, adopted by multiple 
iconoclastic groups, that the hoodie is viewed with suspicion by state 
actors and others in positions of authority. Devon Carbado and Mitu 
Gulati have explained that, “as a matter of both socialization and 
formal or informal political advice, African Americans are encouraged 
to signal cooperation by giving up their privacy” when confronted by 
law enforcement.96 The hoodie can signal, particularly for black 
communities who are disproportionately targeted for state 
surveillance, a lack of cooperation with surveillance efforts and the 
assertion of control and privacy over one’s identity and body.97 Indeed, 
some have suggested that it was Trayvon Martin’s hoodie (coupled 
with his race) that prompted George Zimmerman to become 
suspicious of, and ultimately kill, the young, unarmed teenager.98 This 
is not to say that race played no role in Martin’s killing or violence 
against black individuals — just the opposite.99 Rather, it is to suggest 
that it is in part because black bodies are disproportionately subjected 
to surveillance and structural oppression that the wearing of a hoodie 
shielding those bodies can take on an hyper-expressive tenor — one of 
refusal to be surveilled.100 
 
book, Ta-Nehisi Coates tells the story of how the mother of a black boy killed by the 
police extolled Coates’s son that “You matter. You have value. You have every right to 
wear your hoodie, to play your music as loud as you want. You have every right to be 
you. And no one should deter you from being you.” COATES, supra note 69, at 113. 
 95 Michael McCahill & Rachel Finn, The Social Impact of Surveillance in Three UK 
Schools: ‘Angels’, ‘Devils’ and ‘Teen Mums,’ 7 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 273, 283-84 (2010); 
see also HARCOURT, supra note 73, at 278 (discussing the McCahill & Finn findings).  
 96 CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 62, at 102.  
 97 Cf. id. at 102-03.  
 98 See, e.g., COATES, supra note 69, at 130 (explaining that dominant discourse 
suggested that “Trayvon Martin’s hoodie got him killed”); Brian Palmer, When Did 
Hoodlums Start Wearing Hoods?, SLATE (Mar. 22, 2012, 6:08 PM), http://www.slate. 
com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/03/trayvon_martin_killing_when_did_
hoods_become_associated_with_illicit_activity_.html (“Martin was wearing a hooded 
sweatshirt on the night he was killed, and it may have led Zimmerman to describe him 
as a ‘real suspicious guy’ to a 911 operator.”).  
 99 Cf. Camille Gear Rich, Angela Harris and the Racial Politics of Masculinity: 
Trayvon Martin, George Zimmerman, and the Dilemmas of Desiring Whiteness, 102 
CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1047 (2014) (positing that the tragic killing of Martin arose not 
only from racial dynamics, but out of Zimmerman’s social desire for white, racialized 
masculinity) [hereinafter Angela Harris and Racial Politics]. 
 100 See Nguyen, supra note 81, at 791 (noting that Martin’s friend, Rachel Jeantel, 
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Ta-Nehisi Coates’s contemporary description of the degree to which 
black bodies are targeted for surveillance and control is the most 
direct, and among the most powerful: “white America is a syndicate 
arrayed to protect its exclusive power to dominate and control [black] 
bodies.”101 Coates’s moving account of the violence visited upon black 
bodies echoes that of James Baldwin and many others.102 Surveillance 
— the erosion of public privacy — plays a prominent part in this 
syndicate.103 A prime example of the role of surveillance in the toolbox 
of control over racial minorities is New York City’s “stop-and-frisk” 
program, wherein black and Latino people were targeted on public 
streets for police questioning, detention, and often body frisks.104 Put 
simply, to the extent that the physical bodies of black and Latino 
people are the targets of abuse and subjugation, the privacy barrier 
provided by the hoodie can serve the dual role of shielding and 
 
told Martin to pull up his hoodie because he was being followed); cf. Rashawn Ray, “If 
Only He Didn’t Wear a Hoodie . . . “ Selective Perception and Stereotype Maintenance, in 
GETTING REAL ABOUT RACE 81, 83-86 (Stephanie M. McClure & Cherise A. Harris eds., 
2015) (arguing that to the extent Martin’s hoodie motivated Zimmerman, it was 
because it was associated with his blackness — Zimmerman’s primary motivator).  
 101 COATES, supra note 69, at 42; see also Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The Hard Truths 
of Ta-Nehisi Coates, N.Y. MAG. (July 12, 2015, 9:00 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/ 
intelligencer/2015/07/ta-nehisi-coates-between-the-world-and-me.html (describing the 
vulnerability of black bodies as the “main theme” of Black Lives Matter protests and 
Coates’s writings).  
 102 See, e.g., JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 33-34 (1963) (recounting how 
“[w]hen I was ten, and didn’t look, certainly, any older, two policemen amused 
themselves with me by frisking me, making comic (and terrifying) speculations 
concerning my ancestry and probable sexual prowess, and for good measure, leaving 
me flat on my back in one of Harlem’s empty lots.”); BELL HOOKS, WE REAL COOL: 
BLACK MEN AND MASCULINITY 68 (2004) (lamenting the “ritual[ized] sexualized torture 
of the black body” throughout American history); see also BILLIE HOLIDAY, STRANGE 
FRUIT (Commodore 1939) (“Here is fruit for the crows to pluck, For the rain to 
gather, for the wind to suck, For the sun to rot, for the trees to drop, Here is a strange 
and bitter crop.”). 
 103 Cf. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1326-27 (2008) 
(documenting the state’s “desire to preventatively regulate” individuals through 
innovative surveillance technologies, rather than physical restraint). Indeed, the state 
views the black body itself as expressive and symbolic and targets those bodies for 
surveillance, and worse. See Coleman, supra note 31, at 305 (“The black body has 
been and continues to be hugely symbolic and representative of disorder for state and 
corporate servants — just take current stop and search figures as one indicator of this. 
This body continues to be a site for the enactment of brutalising violence.”).  
 104 Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (observing that 
over 80% of the 4.4 million “stop and frisk” detentions made by NYPD between 2004 
and 2012 were of black or Hispanic individuals). The program was ruled 
unconstitutional because it was being applied in a racially discriminatory manner in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 562. 
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concealing the body from the surveillance regime and communicating 
resistance to that same regime.105 
Additional support for this Article’s contention that the state views 
hoodies or other privacy-enhancing clothes as expressive and, from 
the state’s perspective, “intimidating” can be found in the very 
existence of certain local laws that actually criminalize wearing of a 
hoodie or mask while in public.106 For example, Georgia’s criminal 
code provides that “[a] person is guilty of a misdemeanor when [she 
or] he wears a mask, hood, or device by which any portion of the face 
is so hidden, concealed, or covered as to conceal the identity of the 
wearer and is upon any public way or public property.”107 The state 
recognizes the hoodie — simply by being worn — as a form of 
expressive resistance.108 As Ruthann Robson has noted, “the mask is 
 
 105 Cf. COATES, supra note 69, at 14-17 (documenting how certain apparel items 
served as “armor” against social structures that rendered the black body “naked” to 
the world through, for example, stop-and-frisk policies).  
 106 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.735 (2017) (“A person whose identity is concealed 
by the person in a public place by means of a robe, mask, or other disguise, unless 
based on religious beliefs, or incidental to amusement, entertainment, protection from 
weather, or medical treatment, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
12.7 (2017) (“No person or persons at least 16 years of age shall, while wearing any 
mask, hood or device whereby the person, face or voice is disguised so as to conceal 
the identity of the wearer, enter, be or appear upon any lane, walkway, alley, street, 
road, highway or other public way in this State.”); Stephen J. Simoni, Note, “Who Goes 
There?” — Proposing a Model Anti-Mask Act, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 241, 242-43 (1992) 
(collecting and comparing anti-mask laws which prohibit mere concealment of 
identity, with those that forbid mask-wearing during the commission of a crime). 
 107 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-38 (2017). The Georgia statute survived a First 
Amendment challenge, although the Georgia Supreme Court narrowed the statute to 
apply only to mask-wearing conduct that “provokes a reasonable apprehension of 
intimidation, threats or violence.” State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 552 (Ga. 1990). 
Ironically, several anti-mask laws were originally passed in order to target and 
criminalize the intimidating conduct of the Ku Klux Klan. Wayne R. Allen, Note, Klan, 
Cloth and Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws and the First Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819, 821-
27 (1991). The laws have more recently been seemingly used to target racial minorities. 
See Mark Joseph Stern, Oklahoma Republican Proposes Bill Banning Hoodies in Public, 
SLATE (Jan. 12, 2015, 2:53 PM) [hereinafter Bill Banning Hoodies], http://www. 
slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/01/12/hoodie_ban_oklahoma_republican_proposes_bill
_to_outlaw_wearing_hoods_in.html (explaining that Oklahoma’s proposed hoodie-ban 
was in response to protests over Trayvon Martin’s killing). Other political protestors 
have been targeted, as well. See Noah Feldman, The Constitution Has Masked Protestors 
Covered, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-03-
02/the-constitution-has-masked-protesters-covered (discussing new North Dakota laws 
targeting masks worn by Dakota Access Pipeline protestors). 
 108 See Nguyen, supra note 81, at 802 (explaining that “because it hides, 
camouflages . . . the hoodie (and its racial, colonial sister-other, the hijab) becomes 
itself a criminal, even legally outlawed in some public places as a mobile border zone, 
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prohibited because of what it conveys.”109 Put similarly by Margot 
Kaminski in her exceptionally thorough analysis of anti-mask laws, 
the anonymity provided by head and face coverings “is often seen as 
inherently threatening.”110 Coverings are viewed by the state and its 
agents as a threat and criminalized.111 
As another example, members of the group Anonymous, which 
works to undermine government surveillance (among other 
initiatives), often wear Guy Fawkes masks.112 That the privacy 
 
obstructing the security powers that wish to see the body-as-information more 
perfectly”); Stern, Bill Banning Hoodies, supra note 107 (observing that hoodies 
function as “symbolic speech” and that the Oklahoma “bill is clearly aiming to hinder 
the power of such protests by outlawing one of their most powerful symbolic tools: a 
single piece of clothing”).  
 109 RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY, AND 
DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES 125 (2013).  
 110 Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case 
Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815, 
830 (2013). As Kaminski documents, anti-mask statutes “vary widely in what 
behavior they criminalize.” Id. at 848. And courts have varied in their interpretation 
and treatment of anti-mask regulations, differing in their determinations of whether 
wearing a mask in violation of an anti-mask statute constitutes symbolic speech or 
simply conduct. Id. at 854-73. Compare Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 90-92 
(N.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that masks used to protest the Shah of Iran were symbolic 
speech and had “become a symbol of opposition to” the Shah), and Knights of the Ku 
Klux Klan v. Martin Luther King Jr. Worshippers, 735 F. Supp. 745, 751 (M.D. Tenn. 
1990) (“In the context of parades and demonstrations, certain masks and disguises 
may constitute strong symbolic political expression that is afforded protection by the 
First Amendment.”), with Ryan v. Cty. of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 
1995) (concluding that wearing of anti-filtration mask in courthouse communicates 
intimidation and, at the same time, that the mask was not symbolic speech). 
Sometimes the determination seems to hinge on the nature of the mask (i.e., is it worn 
in a parade, is it a Guy Fawkes mask?). The concept of performative privacy helps 
highlight how a broader array of masks or hoodies ought to be considered expressive 
because, even if they are bland, they may express resistance and opposition to the 
surveillance regime. 
 111 Cf. NEAL, supra note 94, at 163 (arguing that Trayvon Martin’s hoodie “falsely 
marked him as a thug, a threat” — that is, it was interpreted as expressive by 
Zimmerman and the power structures he represented). There may be a legitimate law-
enforcement purpose for a law seeking to prevent those committing crimes from 
wearing masks. But often the anti-masks laws are untethered to any legitimate law 
enforcement purpose — they apply broadly and are not limited to those engaged in 
wrongdoing. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:313 (2017).  
 112 Euclides Montes, The V for Vendetta Mask: A Political Sign of the Times, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2011/sep/10/v-for-vendetta-mask (“[T]he [Guy Fawkes] mask offers [Anonymous] at 
once a political symbol that provides anonymity. And therein lies the symbol’s 
increasing popularity, imbued with a political aura while simultaneously offering the 
comfort (and depending on your activities, the safety) of secrecy.”). The expressive 
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afforded by face coverings can itself express resistance is clear from the 
fact that several Occupy Wall Street protestors were issued citations 
for violating New York’s anti-mask/hood law in 2011.113 The 
government’s own response to the masks highlights their inherent 
expressive content — the government finds the concealment 
expressive and intimidating and uses its own reaction to the 
expressive masks to justify stripping individuals of privacy.114 And the 
Supreme Court has deemed ex ante state determinations that particular 
expressive conduct is intimidating to be unconstitutional regulation of 
speech.115 
Similarly, the empirical study of British school children that 
documented instances where hoods were worn as an expression of 
resistance documented other instances where students would take 
their hoods down specifically because they knew that donning it up 
would mark them for additional surveillance — the hoodie would be 
read as expressing resistance.116 
The expressive power of attempts at physical obfuscation is further 
highlighted by artistic public privacy endeavors. Principally, artist 
Adam Harvey has explored and developed methods for avoiding facial 
recognition software through makeup and hair styles — a project 
 
power of privacy as a form of resistance is also communicated by the group’s name — 
Anonymous.  
 113 Sean Gardiner & Jessica Firger, Rare Charge is Unmasked, WALL STREET J., (Sept. 
20, 2011, at A17; Ruthann Robson, Loitering While Masked: The Wall Street Protest 
Arrests, CONST. L. PROF BLOG (Sept. 22, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
conlaw/2011/09/loitering-while-masked-wall_street-protests.html.  
 114 See, e.g., State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508, 514 (W. Va. 1996) (in upholding an 
anti-mask statute, concluding that “[t]he obvious governmental interest here is the 
protection of citizens from violence and from the fear and intimidation of being 
confronted by someone whom they cannot identify”); cf. D.C. CODE § 22-3312.03(a)-
(b) (2017) (penalizing wearing of mask “[w]ith the intent to intimidate”); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 34 (2017) (criminalizing wearing of disguise with intent to 
“intimidate . . . an officer or other person in the lawful performance of his [or her] 
duty”).  
 115 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 366-67 (2003) (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion) (finding a Virginia statute that declared cross burning prima facie evidence 
of intent to intimidate unconstitutional because it ignored contextual factors that 
could render a cross burning non-intimidating).  
 116 See McCahill & Finn, supra note 95, at 284 (documenting that “one pupil tried 
not to ‘raise the red flag’ by avoiding walking ‘round wiv my hood up . . . even if it’s 
raining because they [security guards] look at you real dodgy’, while another said ‘if 
I’ve got my hood up and I go into a shop, I’ll take it down before’” (citations 
omitted)); see also CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 62, at 18 (suggesting that black 
individuals may “avoid wearing hoodies” as part of their identity performances in 
order to avoid increased scrutiny from law enforcement).  
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called CV Dazzle.117 The techniques attempt to change the lighting 
contrast and space between features, disrupting surveillance software’s 
ability to detect a face. Harvey labels CV Dazzle as a form of 
“expressive interference” — the make-up and hairstyles gain political 
meaning and texture because they are designed to thwart facial 
recognition surveillance.118 In a new, related project, Harvey has 
designed clothing designed to mimic the patterns that facial 
recognition technology interprets as a face in order to confuse and 
subvert the technology.119 Harvey also created a Camoflash Anti-
Paparrazi Clutch, which detects camera flashes and then emits its own 
high-powered light burst capable of overexposing the sensor of the 
camera, obscuring the subject of the photo and holder of the 
Clutch.120 The Clutch — modeled after a fashion accessory — literally 
emits an expressive light message that disrupts the attempt to 
surveil.121 Harvey has also created a line of hoodies and veils made of 
fabrics that block the thermal imaging sometimes done by UAVs or 
drones. He dubbed this apparel “Stealth Wear.”122 To Harvey, the 
apparel is both functionally privacy-enhancing and symbolic; 
communicative.123 It “aims to make a tech statement.”124 
In sum, while Harvey’s quite self-conscious projects are more 
obviously an expressive form of resistance to surveillance, part of this 
Article’s purpose is to illustrate how even quotidian,125 ordinary forms 
 
 117 See Adam R. Harvey, CV Dazzle: Camouflage from Computer Vision, AH 
PROJECTS, https://ahprojects.com/projects/cv-dazzle/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).  
 118 See Adam Harvey, How to Hide from Machines, DIS MAGAZINE, http:// 
dismagazine.com/dystopia/evolved-lifestyles/8115/anti-surveillance-how-to-hide-from-
machines/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017). 
 119 Alex Hern, Anti-Surveillance Clothing Aims to Hide Wearers from Facial 
Recognition, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2017, 2:00 AM EST), https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2017/jan/04/anti-surveillance-clothing-facial-recognition-hyperface. 
 120 See Adam R. Harvey, Camoflash, AH PROJECTS, https://ahprojects.com/projects/ 
camoflash/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).  
 121 See id.  
 122 See Adam R. Harvey, Stealth Wear, AH PROJECTS, https://ahprojects.com/projects/ 
stealth-wear/#summary (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).  
 123 See Tim Maly, Anti-Drone Camouflage: What to Wear in Total Surveillance, WIRED 
(Jan. 17, 2013, 3:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/01/anti-drone-camouflage-apparel/. 
 124 Jenna Wortham, Stealth Wear Aims to Make a Tech Statement, N.Y. TIMES (June 
29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/technology/stealth-wear-aims-to-make-
a-tech-statement.html. 
 125 See MCGRATH, supra note 60, at viii (“While art and theatre work responding to 
surveillance society can help us exist productively in this world, it is still the banal 
experience of day-to-day footage and data that defines our encounter with 
surveillance.”).  
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of functionally maintaining privacy in public spaces are more than just 
functional — they are often expressive.126 As outlined above, the 
government often views the sartorial choice of a hoodie (and masks) 
as a form of resistance — views it as intimidating because it is 
interfering with surveillance — and therefore targets such privacy-
enhancing efforts with specific criminal sanctions. And, drawing from 
the post-structural theory outlined in Part II.A., the expressive power 
of hoodies, masks, and outré forms of physical obfuscation gain 
additional volume precisely because the surveillance regimes have 
made privacy and anonymity such a scare social resource. Purposeful 
wearing of identity-shielding apparel, and the state’s reaction to that 
apparel, helps reveal the true scope of surveillance, and illuminates a 
mode of doctrinally-protected expressive opposition. 
2. Cyber Masks 
The physical world is, of course, not the only “public” realm policed 
and surveilled. The virtual world is also under observation. Perhaps 
even more so than the physical world. And as with efforts to mask 
one’s physical identity, efforts to maintain online and cellular privacy, 
anonymity, or obscurity are also often acts of performative privacy 
intended to express resistance to prevailing surveillance norms. Like 
hoodies or other physical face coverings, technologies and tactics 
designed to obfuscate online activity also communicate. What I dub 
“cyber masks” shield the wearer’s identity and activities but also 
express a particular, outward-facing message. 
As noted in Part II.A, the online world is structured such that in 
order to “live” and participate online, one has to exchange or 
surrender one’s privacy. In opposition to this dominate form of social 
participation sit those who obfuscate or hide their online movements 
through sometimes simple and other times elaborate techniques. Finn 
Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum’s recent book, Obfuscation: A User’s 
Guide for Privacy and Protest, collects and highlights several of the 
obfuscation techniques currently being used to avoid online or cellular 
surveillance.127 Such tactics include, among many others, 
TrackMeNot, which is designed to prevent profiling of users based on 
 
 126 In this way, this Article’s identification of widespread, culturally diverse forms of 
“performative privacy” helps respond to critiques of aestheticized counter surveillance 
resistance, such as Harvey’s, that according to critics does not account for how 
surveillance’s harms are disproportionately felt by marginalized communities. See, e.g., 
Torin Monahan, The Right to Hide? Anti-Surveillance Camouflage and the Aestheticization 
of Resistance, 12 COMMC’N & CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 159, 160-62 (2015).  
 127 BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, supra note 74.  
  
1706 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:1673 
their internet search queries by interspersing genuine queries with 
automated queries, making the individual’s authentic activity more 
difficult for the search engine to discern, profile, and target.128 
Another relatively prominent internet obfuscation method is the use 
of Tor relays.129 At a most basic level, Tor helps conceal internet 
activity by passing the activity through a series of relays such that 
when a user accesses a particular web page, the request is not directly 
linked to the user’s IP address but with an exit node.130 As Brunton 
and Nissenbaum explain, the “labyrinth of relays” is strengthened by 
the number of users who volunteer to serve as relays in the chain of 
obfuscation.131 Relatedly, danah boyd has documented how teenagers 
living public, networked lives actively attempt “to achieve [privacy] in 
spite of structural or social barriers that make it difficult to do so.”132 
They do this, in part, through what boyd and Alice Marwick call 
“social steganography.”133 Aware that their online conversations may 
be read by adults, teens deploy inside jokes, nicknames, or code words 
to share information that cannot be understood by surveilling parents 
or others.134 In this way, they mask or obfuscate the underlying 
meaning of their conversations. 
Obfuscation techniques such as TrackMeNot, Tor, and their many 
cousins,135 certainly serve the purpose of providing some functional 
level of privacy or obscurity. And they certainly serve as a form of 
code, enabling communication.136 But they can serve the dual purpose 
of “expressing protest.”137 Many obfuscation techniques serve “to 
 
 128 Id. at 13-14.  
 129 See Tor Metrics, TOR PROJECT, https://metrics.torproject.org/ (last visited Nov. 
28, 2016) (describing Tor as “the largest deployed anonymity network to date” and 
providing statistics on its scope).  
 130 See Tor: Overview, TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (explaining that “[t]o create a private network pathway with 
Tor, the user’s software or client incrementally builds a circuit of encrypted connections 
through relays on the network.”).  
 131 BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, supra note 74, at 20.  
 132 DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 60 
(2014).  
 133 Id. at 65-66.  
 134 Id.  
 135 See Joh, supra note 86, at 1000-01 (cataloging surveillance defense mechanisms 
including encryption, disposable phone numbers, and ad hoc Faraday cages, among 
others).  
 136 See MCGRATH, supra note 60, at 218-19.  
 137 BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, supra note 74, at 4; see also id. at 59 (“Obfuscation can 
serve a function akin to the hidden transcript, concealing dissent and covert speech 
and providing an opportunity to assert one’s sense of autonomy — an act of refusal 
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register discontent and refusal.”138 And that discontent is with the 
structures of surveillance.139 
As with the physical world, the prevailing structural norm online is 
that one’s privacy is surrendered or taken (depending on your 
perspective). The existence of that structural modus operandi means 
that any oppositional effort to maintain privacy within that structure is 
amplified — the expressive component of cyber masks gains 
amplification in part because of the prevailing norm of privacy 
surrender.140 
The expressive nature of “cyber masks” is brought into relief by the 
fact that, as with physical hoodies or masks, the government responds 
to cyber masks with additional scrutiny and surveillance. As the 
Snowden leaks revealed, “[t]he online anonymity network Tor is a 
high-priority target for the National Security Agency.”141 There is also 
evidence that the NSA tracks anyone who uses an anonymous email 
service, MixMinion; or employs a privacy enhancing operating system, 
Tails; and may even target anyone who searches the internet for 
privacy tools.142 In the wake of attacks by the Islamic State in Paris in 
November 2015, law enforcement’s targeting of encryption users has 
also taken on a more public role.143 Indeed, there are reports that an 
 
concealed within a gesture of assent — or can provide more straightforward tools for 
protest or obscurity.”); Daniel C. Howe, Surveillance Countermeasures: Expressive 
Privacy Via Obfucation, 4:1 APRJA (2015), http://www.aprja.net/surveillance-
countermeasures-expressive-privacy-via-obfuscation (explaining that obfuscation 
tools are “expressive technologies” in that “they exist not only to serve some 
instrumental function, but always also to amplify social, cultural or political 
perspectives”).  
 138 Id. at 90. In fact, according to surveillance studies scholar Torin Monahan, 
although countersurveillance practitioners may have short term practical goals, “they 
are foremost engaged in acts of symbolic resistance.” MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 130. 
 139 See HARCOURT, supra note 73, at 270-71 (describing Tor and other encryption 
and anonymity tools as weapons of resistance used to “fog up that plastic cube in 
which we are trapped”).  
 140 See supra Part II.A.  
 141 Bruce Schneier, Attacking Tor: How the NSA Targets Users’ Online Anonymity, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013, 10:50 AM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ 
oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity; see also Jason Koebler, How the NSA (or 
Anyone Else) Can Crack Tor’s Anonymity, MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 19, 2014, 7:00 AM EST), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/how-the-nsa-or-anyone-else-can-crack-tors-anonymity; 
cf. Calo, supra note 86, at 38 (“If encryption is not usable, or at any rate, if it is not widely 
used, then those who do use encryption can wind up as targets . . . .”).  
 142 See Kim Zetter, The NSA is Targeting Users of Privacy Services, Leaked Code 
Shows, WIRED (July 3, 2014 5:45 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/07/nsa-targets-
users-of-privacy-services/.  
 143 See Haley Sweetland Edwards, Can Silicon Valley Help Beat ISIS?, TIME (Nov. 19, 
  
1708 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:1673 
increasing number of government employees are turning to encrypted 
messaging software, such as Signal or Confide, to protect their 
conversations and that those in positions of authority understand the 
use of encryption to be a statement of resistance.144 More broadly, 
Gary Marx has described how systems of surveillance and efforts to 
neutralize that surveillance are, in effect, engaged in a dialectical back 
and forth — a game of cat and mouse.145 And that game is an 
expressive, communicative one. 
3. Gender Expression 
Efforts to obtain equal rights for transgender individuals sometimes 
involve the twin goals of guaranteeing a right to “gender expression” 
while at the same time ensuring that transgender individuals have the 
ability to keep their trans status private, should they see fit.146 In this 
 
2015), http://time.com/4119951/encryption-can-silicon-valley-help/ (noting that 
national-security officials are increasingly concerned about encryption technologies). 
To a degree, Apple’s recent stand against being forced to create a back door enabling 
law enforcement to subvert phone encryption, and the public praise Apple received, 
also reflects the expressive value of encryption. See Editorial, Why Apple Is Right to 
Challenge an Order to Help the F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2016/02/19/opinion/why-apple-is-right-to-challenge-an-order-to-help-the-
fbi.html.  
 144 Jeff John Roberts, Trump’s Press Secretary Targets Messaging Apps in Leak 
Crackdown, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/27/spicer-phone-
checks/ (discussing Sean Spicer’s “phone check” of staffers and prohibition from using 
secure messaging apps such as Signal and Confide).  
 145 Gary T. Marx, Opinion, A Tack in the Shoe and Taking Off the Shoe: 
Neutralization and Counter-Neutralization Dynamics, 6 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 294, 295-
99 (2009); see also DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 167-169 (2007) (agreeing with 
Marx that everyday acts of resistance to surveillance do occur with some frequency).  
 146 See, e.g., Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037 (SRN/FLN), 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31591, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) (“Transgender is ‘[a]n 
umbrella term that may be used to describe people whose gender expression does not 
conform to cultural norms and/or whose gender identity is different from their sex 
assigned at birth. Transgender is a self-identity, and some gender nonconforming 
people do not identify with this term.’” (alteration in original) (quoting TRANS BODIES, 
TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 620 (Laura Erickson-
Schroth, ed. 2014))). While recent public attention has been brought to the existence 
and importance of people who are transgender, in discussing transgender rights it is 
equally important not to ignore identities that do not fit neatly into “new” categories 
being socially and legally enshrined. See MAGGIE NELSON, THE ARGONAUTS 52-53 
(2015) (“‘[T]rans’ may work well enough as a shorthand, but the quickly developing 
mainstream narrative it evokes (‘born into the wrong body,’ necessitating an 
orthopedic pilgrimage between two fixed destinations) is useless for some . . . ? [F]or 
some, ‘transitioning’ may mean leaving one gender entirely behind, while for 
others . . . it doesn’t?”). Indeed, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick observed, “no matter what 
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way, transgender individuals are often engaged in performative privacy 
— they express or perform their gender identity which, in turn, may 
keep aspects of their biology, medical history, and administrative sex 
classification hidden.147 
As with racial minorities, surveillance and policing of gender non-
conforming people has been extensively documented and affectingly 
described.148 The harms of surveillance are particularly acute for those 
who are both gender non-conforming and racial minorities.149 Pre-
dating the advent of contemporary administrative proposals for 
policing transgender identities (such as restrictive laws for changing 
one’s gender marker on a birth certificate or banning transgender 
access to bathrooms comporting with one’s gender identity), the state 
and police have surveilled, criminalized, and harassed transgender 
individuals.150 As Eric Stanley puts it, “[t]rans/gender-non-conforming 
and queer people, along with many others, are born into webs of 
surveillance.”151 
Examples of the performative privacy rightfully demanded by 
transgender individuals can be seen in the context of opposition to 
laws that forcibly out trans people to potential employers, or laws 
which out a person’s trans status when attempting to use public 
restrooms.152 For instance, some jurisdictions require that in order for 
 
cultural construction, women and men are more like each other than chalk is like 
cheese.” Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Queer and Now, in TENDENCIES 1, 7 (Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick ed., 1993). 
 147 That gender is performed does not suggest that it is in any way inauthentic.  
 148 See, e.g., Wesley Ware, Rounding Up the Homosexuals: The Impact of Juvenile 
Court on Queer and Trans/Gender-Non-Conforming Youth, in CAPTIVE GENDERS: TRANS 
EMBODIMENT AND THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 77, 78 (Eric A. Stanley & Nat Smith 
eds., 2011) (documenting the policing of gender and sexuality in juvenile courts and 
describing one example where a black lesbian was repeatedly arrested anytime the 
perpetrator was described as a “boyish-looking” girl).  
 149 Cf. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (arguing in favor of an intersectional understanding of 
how people may be multiply-burdened).  
 150 See, e.g., Eric A. Stanley, Fugitive Flesh, in CAPTIVE GENDERS: TRANS EMBODIMENT 
AND THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 1, 1 (Eric A. Stanley & Nat Smith eds., 2011) 
(recounting how in 1969 New York City police would enter clubs, line up and check 
all gender-non-conforming people to ensure that people “were wearing the legally 
mandated three pieces of ‘gender appropriate clothing’”).  
 151 Id. at 7.  
 152 For a discussion of how the panoptic architecture of modern lavatories itself 
exposes gender non-conforming individuals, see SHEILA L. CAVANAGH, QUEERING 
BATHROOMS 81 (2010) (arguing that Canadian and American public restrooms “are 
voyeuristic spaces functioning to incite wonder and intrigue while maintaining a 
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an individual to change their gender marker on their birth certificate 
or driver’s license, an individual must first present medical 
documentation indicating that they have undergone gender 
confirmation surgery (sometimes referred to as sex reassignment 
surgery).153 For the many who are unable or choose not to undergo 
surgery,154 such laws publicly out sensitive, intimate information to 
the public, including potential employers, who note the discord 
between the person’s ID and gender presentation.155 In response, 
transgender individuals have argued that they have a right to privacy 
over their transgender identity and a concomitant right to publicly live 
consistent with their true gender identity.156 
Similarly, in a number of states over the last two years, so-called 
“bathroom bills” or “papers-to-pee” laws have been proposed, and in 
some instances (e.g., North Carolina), enacted.157 Certain iterations of 
 
pretense (however dubious) of privacy”).  
 153 See, e.g., LA. O.M.V. GENDER CHANGE/REASSIGNMENT POLICY § I 22.01 (2009) 
(requiring “[a] medical statement signed by a physician stating that the applicant has 
undergone a successful gender change/reassignment” in order to change the gender 
marker on a driver’s license); Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and 
Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government 
Approach to Recognizing the Lives of Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 
400-01 (2013) (documenting jurisdictions that require surgery in order to change the 
gender marker on a birth certificate). 
 154 See Scott Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections for 
Transgender Student Athletes, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 271, 291 (2013) (“[M]edical 
transition — particularly genital surgery — is not affordable, necessary, or appropriate 
for all transgender people.”).  
 155 DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, 
AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 146 (2015) (“Possessing identity documents with incorrect 
gender markets can identify people as transgender in the hiring process, exposing 
them to discrimination. People whose identity documents do not match their self-
understanding or appearance also face heightened vulnerability in interactions with 
police and other public officials . . . .”).  
 156 See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 12, K.L. v. Alaska, No. 3AN-11-05431 CI (Alaska 
Super. Ct., July 19, 2011) (challenging purported surgery requirement for changing 
gender on Alaska driver’s license as a violation of privacy because it both “[r]estrict[s] 
[plaintiff’s] personal autonomy and right to control her appearance” and [f]orc[es] the 
involuntary disclosure of her sensitive, personal information”).  
 157 See Scott Skinner-Thompson, North Carolina Just Lost Some of Its Charm: There’s 
No Way the Governor’s Backward Measures Legalizing Discrimination Against LGBT 
Individuals Can Stand, SALON (Mar. 25, 2016, 11:57 AM UTC), http://www.salon.com/ 
2016/03/25/north_carolina_just_lost_some_of_its_charm_theres_no_way_the_governors
_backward_measures_legalizing_discrimination_against_lgbtq_individuals_can_stand/ 
(critiquing North Carolina’s House Bill 2, which excludes transgender individuals from 
using bathrooms that do not correspond to the sex listed on one’s birth certificate); see 
also Joellen Kralik, “Bathroom Bill” Legislative Tracking, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-bill-legislative-
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these bills would penalize transgender people for using restrooms 
inconsistent with the sex they were assigned at birth or inconsistent 
with an identification document.158 As outlined above, accurate 
identification documents may be difficult to obtain because of onerous 
surgery requirements.159 Some of the laws that have been proposed 
would charge owners of public accommodations with enforcement of 
the laws and punish those proprietors with fines for permitting 
patrons to use the “wrong” restroom.160 And a ballot initiative 
proposed in California would have imposed a $4,000 fine on any 
government entity or person who permitted a person to use a restroom 
inconsistent “with their sex as determined at birth, through medical 
examination, or court judgment recognizing a change of gender.”161 In 
opposition to these draconian laws, transgender rights advocates have 
pointed out, among other arguments, both how they infringe on 
 
tracking635951130.aspx (last updated Mar. 13, 2017) (listing currently pending 
bathroom bills).  
 158 See Jana Kasperkevic, ‘Papers to Pee’: Texas, Kentucky and Florida Consider Anti-
Transgender Bills, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2015, 9:30 PM EDT), http://www.theguardian. 
com/society/2015/mar/24/papers-to-pee-texas-kentucky-and-florida-consider-anti-
transgender-bills; Scott Skinner-Thompson, Anti-Transgender Bathroom Bills Are 
Unconstitutional, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2016, 12:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/ 
2016/02/11/anti_transgender_bathroom_bills_are_clearly_unconstitutional.html.  
 159 The significance of these bathroom regulations and their role as one of the next 
battlegrounds for LGBTQ rights prompted one New York Times commentator to deem 
2015 the “Year of the Toilet.” Jennifer Weiner, Opinion, The Year of the Toilet, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/opinion/the-year-of-the-
toilet.html. But the laws are about much more than toilets; they involve questions 
about whether society will recognize the existence of transgender lives and permit 
transgender people to fully participate in public life. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. 
Bd., No. 16-1733, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6034, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 2017) (“G.G.’s 
case is about much more than bathrooms. It’s about a boy asking his school to treat 
him just like any other boy. It’s about protecting the rights of transgender people in 
public spaces and not forcing them to exist on the margins.”) 
 160 See, e.g., H.B. 583, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015) (“An owner of public 
accommodations, a school, or a place of employment who maintains single-sex public 
facilities and knowingly advertises, promotes, or encourages use of those facilities in 
violation of subsection (2), or fails to take reasonable remedial measures after learning 
of such use, is liable in a civil action to any person who is lawfully using those 
facilities at the time of the unlawful entry for the damages caused by the unlawful 
entry, together with reasonable attorney fees and costs.”). 
 161 Initiative 15-0019, Limits on Use of Facilities in Government Buildings 
and Businesses (Cal. 2015), https://oag.ca.gov/initiatives/search?populate=15-0019. 
Fortunately, in December 2015, Initiative 15-0019 failed to garner the requisite number of 
signatures to qualify for the ballot. Steven Nelson, ‘Bathroom Police’ Initiative Fails to Make 
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individuals’ ability to publicly live and express their true gender 
identity and infringe on their privacy.162 
Relatedly, students who argue that Title IX permits them to 
participate on sex-segregated athletic teams consistent with their 
gender identity are literally demanding the ability to perform in public 
in a way that also permits them to potentially downplay or keep 
private their sex assigned at birth.163 
Certainly one could (and should) assert that an individual’s right to 
express and live their gender identity is not necessarily contingent on 
maintaining an element of privacy over the gender one was assigned 
on a birth certificate or certain aspects of one’s anatomy. And for many 
gender non-conforming people that is certainly the case, depending on 
the context. That is, many people are open and rightly proud about 
their transgender identity and make no qualms or efforts to pass as 
cisgender.164 But even for those who are open as to their transgender 
identity within certain confines, they may well reject forced revelation 
of those intimate details in other contexts — for example, every time 
they attempt to use a public restroom. 
 
 162 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, Carcano v. McCrory, No. 1:16-CV-00236-
TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. April 21, 2016) (asserting constitutional informational privacy 
claim); STUART BIEGEL, THE RIGHT TO BE OUT 190 (2010) (arguing that a student’s 
access to the bathroom corresponding to their gender identity advances “the state’s 
compelling interest in protecting the safety, equality, and privacy of all students”); 
Civil Rights Coalition Ready to Launch Education Campaign Following Failed Anti-
Transgender Ballot Push, L.A. LGBT CTR. (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.lalgbtcenter. 
org/civil_rights_coalition_ready_to_launch_education_campaign_following_failed_ant
i_transgender_ballot_push (quoting Dave Garcia, the Director of Public Policy and 
Community Building for the Los Angeles LGBT Center as arguing that “[n]o one 
should fear harassment, interrogation or a lawsuit simply for using the bathroom that 
corresponds with their gender identity.”); Peeing in Peace: A Resource Guide for 
Transgender Activists and Allies, TRANSGENDER L. CTR. (2005), https://transgenderlawcenter. 
org/resources/public-accommodations/peeing-in-peace (last visited Feb. 14, 2017) 
(emphasizing that sometimes the best strategy for avoiding confrontation or harassment 
when using the bathroom corresponding to one’s gender identity is to try be as invisible as 
possible). 
 163 See Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 154, at 288, 297 (outlining the social 
benefits of permitting trans students to participate on teams consistent with their gender 
identity, and explaining how locker room related privacy concerns of both trans and 
cisgender students can be accommodated); Scott Skinner-Thompson, The Department of 
Education’s Common-Sense Approach to Transgender Inclusion, SLATE (Nov. 4, 2015, 10:42 
AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/11/04/transgender_high_school_students_ 
a_curtain_can_make_a_difference.html (explaining that transgender privacy is part and 
parcel of ensuring equal participation in school activities).  
 164 Someone is cisgender if they their self-identity is consistent with the gender 
they were assigned at birth.  
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As Ruthann Robson has explained, rightly or wrongly, “[t]he 
doctrines that develop to elaborate constitutional rights are hierarchal 
ones: rights of political expression are valued more highly than rights 
of sexual expression.”165 Therefore, to the extent that claims for 
gender expression are framed in terms of the politics of expression and 
a refusal to be surveilled by the state, they may be on stronger 
doctrinal and discursive footing, as elaborated more fully in Part III.166 
In sum, many of the arguments raised by transgender rights 
advocates sound simultaneously in a right to expression and a right to 
privacy — they are, in some ways, demanding a right to performative 
privacy, to be able to express one’s true identity publicly167 while 
concealing other, potentially linked aspects of that identity. And the 
importance of those gender and privacy performances cannot be 
understated. As Butler explained: “There is no gender identity behind 
the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted 
by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”168 As such, 
understanding the expressive, performative role of functional efforts to 
maintain privacy (and providing protections for those expressions) is 
critical to enabling the democratic constitution of privacy and gender 
norms. 
4. Head Veils 
Head coverings worn by some Muslim women can also serve as a 
form of performative privacy. Without question, head coverings can 
have multiple meanings, including independent religious and cultural 
significance.169 Of course, sometimes they are worn for no religious 
purpose at all.170 But historically and with renewed vigor, Western 
 
 165 ROBSON, supra note 109, at 2. 
 166 See infra Part III. 
 167 Cf. ROBSON, supra note 109, at 67 (“Clearly, prohibitions on gender 
nonconforming sartorial choices implicate both equality and expressive constitutional 
concerns.”); Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2000) (suggesting that minority identities are often 
themselves expressive in part because they operate as a form of dissent); Nancy J. 
Knauer, “Simply So Different”: The Uniquely Expressive Character of the Openly Gay 
Individual After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 89 KY. L.J. 997, 1001 (2000-2001) 
(arguing that because of heteronormative social structures, openly gay individuals’ 
identity operates as both expressive and politicized).  
 168 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 61, at 33.  
 169 See generally FADWA EL GUINDI, VEIL: MODESTY, PRIVACY AND RESISTANCE (DRESS, 
BODY, CULTURE) (1999) (extensively documenting the role of the veil across history, 
different countries and cultures, sexes, and religions).  
 170 For an illuminating discussion regarding the meaning of head scarves to both 
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societies and governments have attempted to force Muslim women to 
remove their veils. The veils have, in certain contexts, come to serve as 
an expressive demand for, and claim to, modesty at the same time they 
functionally provide a degree of privacy/modesty.171 And this is true 
with regard to head coverings that leave the face exposed, such as a 
hijab, or veils that cover the face or the whole body, such as a niqab or 
burka.172 
To reiterate, a head veil can be worn for many reasons — many of 
which have nothing to do with privacy or religion.173 And, as with 
hoodies or questions of gender expression, I would hesitate before 
speculating why a particular individual decided to wear a veil.174 But 
for present purposes — for the purposes of discerning the role of 
performative privacy — it is significant and telling that governments 
and corporations react to the wearing of head veils as if it were an 
expressive demand for control over one’s body. That is, the veil is read 
and interpreted by surveillance regimes as a form of expressive 
resistance.175 
 
Muslims and those, such as the French government, who seek to limit their use, see 
generally JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL (2007) [hereinafter POLITICS 
OF THE VEIL].  
 171 EL GUINDI, supra note 169, at xvii (explaining that at the end of the twentieth 
century, veiling in certain Arab cultures “is largely about identity, largely about 
privacy – of space and body,” and sometimes “symbolizes an element of power and 
autonomy and functions as a vehicle for resistance,” but also observing that 
conceptions of privacy are not consistent across cultures).  
 172 The fact that veils may not, in all instances, totally obscure the wearer’s identity 
does not render them meaningless as privacy protections. As with hoodies, body and 
face coverings still keep aspects of one’s identity secret — privacy is not all or nothing. 
ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY 47 (2011) (“Clothing can conceal the precise look 
and contours of a person’s body. Clothing can render age, sex, or race invisible. 
Clothing can be a shelter, a cocoon, an emblem of reserve.”).  
 173 See JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE HEADSCARVES 70 (2007) 
(noting that sociologists have “traced the range and variation in motives and meanings 
attached to scarf-wearing” and that “these studies showed these motives and meanings 
to be complex, to be quite different from one woman to the next, and to shift over a 
lifetime”). 
 174 Id. at 78 (interviewing three women who “objected to efforts by others to attach 
objective meanings to the voile”); see also Raja El Habti, Dir. Of Research, KARAMA, 
THE VEIL CONTROVERSY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE, Panel 
at The Brookings Center of the United States and Europe and the Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life (Apr. 19, 2004), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/ 
2004/4/19france/20040419.pdf (explaining that Muslim women “should have the right 
to speak for themselves and that we should ask them what this veils means for them, 
not what it means for us”).  
 175 Cf. Amy Adler, Performance Anxiety: Medusa, Sex and the First Amendment, 21 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 227, 243-49 (2009) (arguing that Medusa resisted the male gaze 
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Before turning to American governmental responses to head veils, it 
is important to discuss the European reaction, which has often been 
more extreme. For example, in 2004 the French Parliament banned 
the wearing of head veils in public schools.176 By its terms, the law 
targets all “conspicuous” religious symbols, but the focus of the debate 
surrounding the law was on banning Muslim head veils and scarves.177 
In discussion leading up to the ban, then-President Jacques Chirac 
said that there was “something aggressive” in a head veil and that 
“[w]earing a veil, whether we want it or not, is a sort of aggression 
that is difficult for us to accept.”178 As with anti-mask laws, head 
coverings are interpreted by the state as expressing something 
aggressive. They are read as hostile, in part, because they cut off the 
ability of the state and dominant society to surveil, to gaze.179 As Joan 
Wallach Scott has explained, French cultural imperialism is built in 
part on the ability “to know one’s subjects” and part of knowing one’s 
subject involves “‘tear[ing] off the veil which still hides the mores, 
customs, and ideas’ of Arab society.”180 Put more bluntly by Scott, the 
 
with her own deadly stare, expressing herself and casting herself as a gender outlaw).  
 176 Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, 
le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, 
collèges et lycées publics [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 Governing, Under the 
Principle of Secularism, the Wearing of Symbols or Clothing Denoting Religious 
Affiliation in Schools, Colleges and Public High Schools], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], March 17, 2004, p. 5190. 
 177 See SCOTT, POLITICS OF THE VEIL, supra note 170, at 151-56. 
 178 John Henley, Something Aggressive About Veils, Says Chirac, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2003, 
9:21 PM EST), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/06/france.jonhenley; see also 
ALLEN, supra note 172, at 53 (recounting an incident where a retired French school teacher 
ripped the veil off a Muslim woman in a retail store because “wearing the veil is an act of 
aggression”).  
 179 Cf. TIMOTHY MITCHELL, COLONISING EGYPT 33 (1988) (describing the importance 
of observation and ordering to the colonial enterprise); Sonia Dayan-Herzbrun, The 
Issue of the Islamic Headscarf, in WOMEN, IMMIGRATION AND IDENTITIES IN FRANCE 77 
(Jane Freedman & Carrie Tarr eds., 2000) (quoting one Algerian Muslim women as 
explaining that: “In covering my body, I present myself in such a way that men are 
only interested in my character and my behavior, in short they consider me as a 
human being. In freeing myself from the male gaze I affirm my liberty.”); EL GIUNDI, 
supra note 169, at 23 (“The Euro-Christian gaze at Muslim culture . . . has been a gaze 
of violence, dominance, distortion and belittlement”). 
 180 SCOTT, POLITICS OF THE VEIL, supra note 170, at 49 (citing Julia Clancy-Smith, La 
Femme Arabe: Women and Sexuality in France’s Northern African Empire, in AMIRA EL 
AZHARY SONBOL, ed., WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND DIVORCE LAWS IN ISLAMIC HISTORY 56 
(Syracuse, N.Y. Syracuse University Press, 1996).  
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veil is “an impenetrable membrane, the final barrier to political 
subjugation.”181 
Not content with banning head veils in public schools, in 2010 
France banned the wearing of full-face veils — including niqabs and 
burkas — in public places.182 The French ban was upheld by the 
European Court of Human Rights in 2014.183 In justifying the ban, the 
ECHR specifically relied on the French government’s argument that 
head veils interfered with people’s ability to “live together” because it 
limited social interaction.184 In other words, the court viewed people’s 
ability to surveil and observe one another in public as a key 
constitutional value. As Judith Butler has argued, veil restrictions 
“condition the entrance to the public sphere” on a compulsory 
disaffiliation with one’s religion and, I would add, a surrender of one’s 
privacy.185 Public space, rather than being a place where people are 
able to come and engage in the market place of ideas on their own 
terms, is instead a site where they are stripped and exposed to 
surveillance.186 In short, while the French government’s motivation for 
such laws is complex, touching on issues of race, religion, 
immigration, and sexuality, the laws are part of a history of attempting 
to surveil and observe Muslim bodies. 
But France is not alone in its efforts to surveil Muslim communities 
generally, nor in its attempts to force women to remove their head 
coverings specifically.187 The veil has also been targeted in the United 
 
 181 Id. at 67. The reality of the gendered surveillance gaze is amplified by the fact 
that though certain surveillance regimes, such as CCTV cameras, are sometimes 
justified as a means of protecting women from harassment, surveillance cameras can 
just as plausibly serve as a means of harassment by peeping toms. See Hille Koskela, 
Video Surveillance, Gender, and the Safety of Public Urban Space: “Peeping Tom” Goes 
High Tech?, 23 URB. GEOGRAPHY, 257, 264 (2002).  
 182 See Loi 2010-1192 du 10 Octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage 
dans l’espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 10, 2010 on prohibiting concealment 
of the face in the public space], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 7, 2010.  
 183 S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 59-60 (2014).  
 184 Id. at 55.  
 185 BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note 66, at 82.  
 186 EL GIUNDI, supra note 169, at 77-82 (explaining how, in certain contexts, Arab 
conceptions of privacy are relational and public and that the veil can help negotiate 
boundaries within public space).  
 187 Other European countries, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, have also 
restricted face coverings in public spaces. See Alice Foster, Where in the World Are the Burka 
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States, albeit to a lesser degree.188 For example, law enforcement 
agencies such as the New York Police Department have created 
specific initiatives targeting Muslim communities for surveillance.189 
The legality of such programs is currently being challenged in federal 
court.190 These programs have had a specific effect on those who 
would otherwise wear a head or full-body covering. A report co-led by 
three non-governmental organizations documented how the NYPD’s 
surveillance program was causing Muslim individuals to avoid wearing 
clothes, including head coverings, that might identify them as Muslim 
out of fear that such clothing would draw law enforcement 
suspicion.191 Such fear is no surprise given that a 2007 NYPD report 
on its theory of Muslim radicalization suggested that one “typical 
signature” of radicalization was the wearing of traditional Islamic 
clothing.192 The NYPD has viewed head coverings as expressing 
something dangerous, and has responded to that expression with 
additional surveillance and targeting by law enforcement. 
Of course, there may also be discriminatory racial and religious 
motivations for such laws. But part of what colors Western society’s 
view that head veils are rhetorically aggressive is that it prevents the 
state and its agents from observing and surveilling Muslim women’s 
 
 188 Cf. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, The Post 9/11 “Hijab” as Icon, 68 SOC. OF RELIGION 
253, 263 (2007) (explaining that “in an America traumatized by 9/11, many 
Americans began to identify the hijab as the standard of the enemy”).  
 189 Hassan v. City of N.Y., 804 F.3d 277, 285 (3d Cir. 2015) (outlining alleged 
scope of NYPD’s Muslim surveillance program, which includes video monitoring 
mosques and those who enter and exit those mosques and embedding undercover 
officers in Muslim community organizations, among other tactics). 
 190 See id.; see also Matthew A. Wasserman, Note, First Amendment Limitations on 
Police Surveillance: The Case of the Muslim Surveillance Program, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1786, 1821-23 (2015) (arguing that the surveillance program chills expressive 
behavior in violation of the First Amendment). 
 191 MUSLIM AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES COAL. ET AL., MAPPING MUSLIMS: NYPD SPYING AND 
ITS IMPACT ON MUSLIM AMERICANS 15-16 (2013) (“Almost all our interviewees noted 
that appearing Muslim, or appearing to be a certain type of Muslim, invites unwanted 
attention or surveillance from law enforcement. Outward displays of Muslim identity 
could include the choice to wear the hijab (headscarf), the niqab (full covering), grow 
a beard, or dress in certain kinds of traditional or Islamic clothing. That surveillance 
should focus on such details results from the NYPD’s radicalization theory, which 
posits that decisions about dress or appearance are no longer just signifiers of 
personal, religious choices or cultural identities but rather serve as indicators of 
‘dangerousness.’”).  
 192 MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, 
RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 31 (2007), http://sethgodin. 
typepad.com/seths_blog/files/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf. 
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bodies.193 Indeed, in the aftermath of the attacks by members/
sympathizers of the Islamic State in Paris and San Bernardino in the 
fall of 2015, there was an uptick in targeting of women wearing head 
veils in the United States194 — even when the veils were being worn by 
people out of sympathy with Muslim women rather than any 
independent personal conviction.195 
One may be inclined to believe that America’s protections for 
religious freedom are enough to provide Muslims with the legal rights 
they need to wear a head covering, and that conceptualizing head veils 
as acts of performative privacy is redundant. That would be a mistake. 
The U.S. Constitution and statutory protections such as Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act and Religious Freedom Restoration Acts extend 
formal protections for religious free exercise.196 But, in practice, those 
purported safeguards fail to fully protect Muslim individuals’ ability to 
wear religious apparel or fully embrace Muslim grooming 
requirements. For example, in Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. GEO Group Inc., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that a private company that ran a Pennsylvania correctional 
facility was entitled to summary judgment in a claim by a class of 
female Muslim employees notwithstanding that the company refused 
to allow the women to wear head coverings, called khimars, to 
work.197 While the employer purported to ban head coverings of all 
kinds, including hats, for security and contraband purposes, evidence 
suggested that the policy was inconsistently applied and that certain 
hats were, in fact, permitted notwithstanding security concerns.198 The 
safety rationale was further undermined by evidence suggesting that 
 
 193 See SCOTT, POLITICS OF THE VEIL, supra note 170, at 49.  
 194 Eric Lichtblau, Crimes Against Muslim Americans and Mosques Rise Sharply, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/us/politics/crimes-against-
muslim-americans-and-mosques-rise-sharply.html (noting that hate crimes against 
Muslims, including hijab-wearing students, had tripled in the wake of attacks in Paris 
and San Bernardino).  
 195 See, e.g., Christine Hauser, Wheaton College Professor Is Put on Leave After Remarks 
on Islam, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/us/wheaton-
college-professor-larycia-hawkins-muslim-scarf.html (documenting suspension of 
professor who wore head veil in solidarity with Muslims).  
 196 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); see also Scott 
Thompson, House of Wisdom or a House of Cards? Why Teaching Islam in U.S. Foreign 
Detention Facilities Violates the Establishment Clause, 88 NEB. L. REV. 341, 346 (2009) 
(outlining the religion clause).  
 197 EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 277 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 198 Id. at 286 (Tashima, J., dissenting).  
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the employer made little effort to enforce the policy until it became 
aware of a request by an employee to wear her khimar.199 
There are several other examples of courts failing to protect 
women’s ability to wear Muslim head coverings notwithstanding the 
existence of laws protecting religious expression.200 As Robson has 
summarized, such cases “belie simplistic [and I would add 
widespread] assumptions that the First Amendment’s religious 
protections prevent prohibitions of women wearing the hijab or 
niqab.”201 Instead, the religious protection that ought to be afforded to 
such head coverings is often subverted in the courts.202 
There is therefore space for the concept of performative privacy to 
help advance the doctrinal protections for head veils. To be certain, 
often legal protections for identity-based claims are only enforced 
when that claim is coupled or linked with a non-identity-based 
claim.203 The recent Supreme Court decisions in United States v. 
Windsor204 and Obergefell v. Hodges205 help highlight this point. In 
both cases, the Supreme Court relied on equal protection and 
substantive due process principles to protect the rights of same-sex 
couples to marry.206 Thus, in ways similar to hoodies, the state reads 
 
 199 See id. (Tashima, J., dissenting).  
 200 See, e.g., Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming 
grant of summary judgment for defendant City of Philadelphia notwithstanding its 
refusal to permit plaintiff employee to wear her Muslim headscarf); United States v. 
Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 891 (3d Cir. 1990) (refusal to permit substitute teacher to 
teach in Muslim full body covering did not violate Title VII); Muhammad v. Paruk, 
553 F. Supp. 2d 893, 900 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (denying woman relief when she was 
required to remove face veil in order to testify in her own lawsuit); Freeman v. Dep’t 
of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48, 57 (Fla. App. 2006) (Florida’s 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act did not forbid state from requiring Muslim woman 
to remove face veil for driver’s license photo). 
 201 ROBSON, supra note 109, at 151.  
 202 But see EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2037 
(2015) (denying employer summary judgment in Title VII employment discrimination 
where employer refused to hire Muslim applicant because her headscarf would violate 
the employer’s dress code).  
 203 Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748-50 
(2011) (observing that “constitutional equality and liberty claims are often 
intertwined” and that liberty themes may find broader acceptance with the Supreme 
Court).  
 204 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 205 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 206 In Windsor, the Court also used federalism principles to bolster its holding. See, 
e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in 
Motion, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 87, 144 (2014) (documenting the use of federalism to as 
“an enabling device” for the protection of individual rights).  
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the veil as an aggressive form of resistance to its surveillance efforts 
and targets the veil for specific sanction, highlighting the ways in 
which a veil does, in fact, sometimes serve as a form of performative 
privacy and expression against those surveillance regimes. 
To conclude, post-structural performativity theory suggests that 
societal structures can imbue certain functional acts with expressive 
meaning in relation to those social structures. In the context of public 
privacy, the widespread surveillance regimes now in place help steep 
individual efforts to maintain privacy with expressive value — the 
functional wearing of a hoodie, utilization of Tor, or refusal to comply 
with laws designed to out one’s birth-assigned gender are not 
normatively neutral acts. They are replete with meaning and often 
express opposition to the widespread attempts by surveillance regimes 
to eradicate privacy while in public. As this Part suggested, evidence of 
performative privacy’s salience comes not just from theory, but also 
from the state’s reaction to functional efforts to maintain privacy. In 
the final Part, I discuss the doctrinal and discursive implications for 
conceiving of efforts to maintain privacy in this way; for 
understanding acts of public privacy as performative and expressive. 
III. PERFORMATIVE PRIVACY’S POWER 
Part III turns to the implications, or payoffs, of a theory of 
performative privacy. First, identification of performative privacy as a 
conceptual theory of public privacy may help bring acts of public 
privacy within the First Amendment’s doctrinal ambit, avoiding 
current barriers posed by the secrecy paradigm. Second, performative 
privacy may help redraw the line between public and private, helping 
positively frame acts of public privacy, and discursively shaping public 
attitudes towards attempts to obtain privacy in public (and the social 
controversies that are often closely tied to such attempts). 
A. Doctrinal Implications 
The First Amendment provides robust protections for freedom of 
expression. That protection extends to what has been dubbed 
“expressive conduct” and “symbolic speech,” and is not limited to so-
called “pure speech.”207 To be clear, I am not suggesting that all 
regulation of acts of performative privacy are necessarily content-
based and would fail under the First Amendment. My objectives with 
 
 207 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989) (holding that flag 
burning is conduct protected by the First Amendment).  
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regard to doctrine are more modest — to show that the concept of 
performative privacy helps us understand how acts of public privacy 
are expressive and, therefore, how the First Amendment might cover 
and provide meaningful protection for acts of public privacy. 
Generally, the test applied to determine whether government action 
unconstitutionally infringes on expressive conduct or symbolic speech 
is the same as that applied to “pure” speech.208 If the government 
regulation at issue is content-based (that is, targeted toward a 
particular subject matter or message), it is subject to strict scrutiny 
and often found to be unconstitutional.209 However, as the Court held 
in United States v. O’Brien, the government may impose content-
neutral time, place and manner restrictions on expressive conduct so 
long as those restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest and leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication.210 
But more crucial for present purposes is whether acts of 
performative privacy could satisfy the initial hurdle — that is, whether 
they could be classified as expressive.211 An analysis of Supreme Court 
 
 208 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment 
generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, 
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.”); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of 
Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 33 (1973) (“Any 
attempt to disentangle ‘speech’ from conduct which is itself communicative will not 
withstand analysis. The speech element in symbolic speech is entitled to no lesser 
(and also no greater) degree of protection than that accorded to so-called pure speech. 
Indeed, in one sense all speech is symbolic.”).  
 209 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S 443, 457-58 (2011) (holding that Westboro 
Baptist’s political speech outside of a funeral was entitled to “special protection” 
against content-based tort regulation of that speech); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (“[T]he First Amendment means that government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content.”); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (“Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.”). 
 210 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to regulation which had incidental impact on expressive conduct); see also 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27 (2010) (noting that if a generally applicable law is directed 
at an individual because of their expressive conduct, the O’Brien intermediate scrutiny 
standard will not apply). 
 211 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 
(2006) (determining whether the conduct was, in fact, expressive before applying the 
O’Brien level of scrutiny); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403 (noting that the first step is to 
determine if the conduct is expressive and, if so, then determine whether strict 
scrutiny or the more relaxed O’Brien standard applies); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The 
First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 772 (2001) (“As the Supreme Court 
has reemphasized in subsequent cases such as Texas v. Johnson, a flag-burning 
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jurisprudence scrutinizing whether a particular act is expressive 
conduct — whether it is “speech” — and thus entitled to First 
Amendment protections, demonstrates that many of the acts of 
performative privacy outlined above ought to be protected against 
government incursion by the First Amendment.212 
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston, Inc., the Supreme Court articulated in detail the close 
relationship between conduct that is also communicative and the right 
to free expression.213 In that case, the Court considered whether the 
private organizers of a St. Patrick’s Day parade could be forced by a 
local non-discrimination ordinance to include a gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual organization in the parade or whether the forced inclusion 
violated the parade organizers’ First Amendment rights. The Court 
analyzed whether the parade, while certainly involving conduct, was 
also a form of expression. The Court rather easily concluded that 
parades are “a form of expression, not just motion,” notwithstanding 
that they involve a large degree of conduct — marching, waving, sign 
holding.214 The Court explained that “[t]he protected expression that 
inheres in a parade is not limited to its banners and songs, however, 
for the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as 
mediums of expression.”215 The Court reiterated that “symbolism is a 
primitive but effective way of communicating ideas.”216 
Importantly, as others such as Stuart Benjamin have observed,217 in 
Hurley, the Court defined the kinds of conduct entitled to First 
Amendment protection expansively, holding that “a narrow, 
 
decision, the O’Brien test is not triggered — indeed no First Amendment scrutiny is 
triggered — if the defendant was not engaged in ‘expressive conduct.’”).  
 212 Again, my purpose here is not to methodically determine whether each of the 
regulations discussed in Part II is content-based or content-neutral, thereby 
determining the appropriate level of scrutiny, strict or intermediate. Both forms of 
scrutiny are relatively robust, requiring either compelling or substantial government 
interests and narrowly tailored regulations, and are certainly more robust than the 
weak protections provided by the Fourth Amendment discussed in Part I. Rather, it is 
to show how acts of performative privacy could be considered expressive conduct, 
implicating First Amendment scrutiny in the first instance.  
 213 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., Inc., 515 
U.S. 557, 568-70 (1995).  
 214 Id. at 568.  
 215 Id. at 569.  
 216 Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)).  
 217 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 
1464 (2013) (noting that the Supreme Court has, on many occasions, protected 
communication that does not express a clear viewpoint and that Hurley seemed to 
reject the “particularized message” requirement). 
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succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional 
protection” and that the expression need not convey a particularized 
message.218 In fact, the Court noted that mere participation in the 
parade was expressive.219 By emphasizing that no particularized 
message need be communicated by the conduct, the Hurley opinion 
seemed to soften the standard articulated in Spence v. Washington, 
where the Court had suggested that affixing a peace symbol to an 
American flag was protected speech because “[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message was present.”220 
Consistent with its expansive approach to determining whether 
conduct counts as protected speech, the Court has protected, to 
varying degrees, cross burning,221 flag burning,222 black armbands 
worn to express a certain view,223 sit-ins at public libraries,224 nude 
dancing and other forms of entertainment,225 among many other 
examples.226 Famously, the Court has also held that the expenditure of 
 
 218 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. 
 219 See id. at 570.  
 220 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974); see also Condon v. Wolfe, 
310 Fed. App’x. 807, 819 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court subsequently 
minimized the ‘particularized message’ requirement.”); Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 
1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Supreme Court liberalized the standard 
and therefore that “in determining whether conduct is expressive, we ask whether the 
reasonable person would interpret it as some sort of message, not whether an observer 
would necessarily infer a specific message.”); cf. Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the 
Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the First Amendment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1423, 
1423 (2014) (suggesting that even speech deemed “nonsense” may be entitled to First 
Amendment protections). 
 221 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).  
 222 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989) (holding that the American 
flag is “[p]regnant with expressive content” and that the government may not 
“proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements”). 
 223 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) 
(holding that wearing of armbands to protest Vietnam War “was closely akin to ‘pure 
speech’ which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under 
the First Amendment.”). 
 224 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (“As this Court has repeatedly 
stated, [First Amendment] rights are not confined to verbal expression. They embrace 
appropriate types of action which certainly include the right in a peaceable and 
orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a place where the 
protestant has every right to be, the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities.”). 
 225 See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); see also City of 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 302 (2000) (O’Connor, J., plurality) 
(concluding that nude dancing is expressive conduct but that ban on public nudity 
survived O’Brien intermediate scrutiny). 
 226 Cf. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding fist in 
air during pledge of allegiance was expressive conduct and possibly even pure 
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money in political campaigns, while sometimes containing an element 
of conduct, is protected First Amendment speech.227 
Within the specific context of clothing, relevant to multiple 
examples of performative privacy, “[a]ttire bearing words or symbols 
is much more likely to meet the expressive threshold necessary to 
invoke First Amendment protections . . . [but] even unadorned 
apparel can speak volumes.”228 And while First Amendment 
challenges to regulation of people wearing saggy pants for indecent 
exposure, disorderly conduct, or violation of dress codes have met 
with mixed results (often because it is not clear if a message is being 
communicated229 or that the message is understood230), the concept of 
performative privacy helps give shape and contour to the message 
conveyed by hoodies, head veils, and the like — a political message of 
resistance to surveillance. 
That is, to the extent the Spence “particularized message” 
requirement does survive Hurley, performative privacy helps 
distinguish hoodies and head veils from other kinds of apparel (such 
as saggy pants) that have not received consistent First Amendment 
protection. 
 
speech); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
1063 (3d ed. 2006) (listing several examples of symbolic speech); Genevieve Lakier, 
Sport as Speech, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1109, 1111 (2014) (arguing that spectator sports 
are expressive and entitled to First Amendment coverage). But see Zalewska v. Cty. of 
Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 320 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a woman who wore a skirt 
when dress code required that she wear pants was not protected by First Amendment 
because message she sought to convey was not particularized or easily comprehensible 
by others). 
 227 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“Some forms of communication 
made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some 
involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two.”); cf. Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).  
 228 ROBSON, supra note 109, at 110; see also Onika K. Williams, Note, The 
Suppression of a Saggin’ Expression: Exploring the “Saggy Pants” Style Within a First 
Amendment Context, 85 IND. L.J. 1169, 1173 (2010) (explaining that “[b]ecause the 
saggy-pants style communicates a message of fashionable disobedience . . . wearing 
saggy pants is an expressive form of conduct through which the style assures 
individual self-fulfillment in a democratic society, that saggy pants are a form of 
communication, and that the saggy-pants style satisfies the expressive-conduct test of 
Spence v. Washington”).  
 229 ROBSON, supra note 109, at 121.  
 230 Bivens ex rel. Green v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 561 (D.N.M. 
1995) (finding “that Plaintiff’s subjective message supposedly conveyed by wearing 
saggy pants is by no means apparent to those who view it”).  
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Similarly, with regard to the requirement, also from Spence, that the 
audience be able to “understand” the message,231 the government 
does, indeed, understand that efforts to functionally resist surveillance 
by wearing a hoodie or head veil are expressing a message of resistance 
to surveillance, deems that particular message as one of resistance or 
intimidation, and responds with regulation, as outlined in Part II.232 
Furthermore, acts of performative privacy are unlike the conduct 
involved in cases such as Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and 
Institutional Rights.233 There, the Supreme Court rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to the Solomon Amendment, which required 
educational institutions to permit military recruitment on campus, 
because the conduct at issue (refusal to permit recruiters) only gained 
expressive meaning when accompanied by speech.234 Acts of 
performative privacy are more intrinsically expressive even when 
unaccompanied by separate speech because of the context or 
structures of surveillance. That is, like the wearing of black arm bands 
in Tinker v. Des Moines,235 which only became expressive in the social 
context of the Vietnam War, acts of performative privacy are imbued 
with expression because of the social context of widespread 
surveillance. In fact, Spence, too, emphasizes the importance of 
“surrounding circumstances” to the determination of whether conduct 
is understood as expressive.236 Similarly, as Jocelyn Simonson has 
artfully explained, “by visibly challenging authority, the action of 
filming police officers in public is an expression of dissent,” separate 
and apart from any First Amendment activity the filming may 
facilitate.237 It is the “in-the-moment” context of filming police activity 
or abuse (or, as I argue, demanding privacy) that helps provide that 
conduct its expressive meaning. 
In sum, in the same way that conduct can be audibly silent and yet 
protected expression, merely because some conduct may involve an 
aspect of actual, oral communication, does not dictate that the 
 
 231 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974). 
 232 See supra Part II.B (discussing enforcement of anti-mask laws where hoodies are 
deemed intimidating). 
 233 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006).  
 234 See id.  
 235 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).  
 236 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 411; cf. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003) 
(O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (noting the importance of “contextual factors” to 
determining expressive conduct’s meaning).  
 237 Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the 
Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1573 (2016). 
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communication is protected by the First Amendment, as explained in 
Rumsfeld.238 The use of words is not the lynchpin, one way or another, 
in determining whether the First Amendment applies.239 Speech is not 
the sine qua non of expression. 
That said, reinforcing the view that functional demands for privacy 
may also be viewed as legally-protected speech — as expressive — is 
the Supreme Court’s broad view of what types of information, or data, 
counts as protected expression. There is a growing body of law 
recognizing that mere transmission of facts, or data, can communicate 
and that, in certain situations (but not necessarily always), the 
transmission of data ought to be entitled to First Amendment 
protections.240 There is also authority concluding that computer code 
itself is protected speech.241 And others have documented authority 
suggesting that algorithm-based search engine results might also be 
entitled to First Amendment protection.242 
 
 238 547 U.S. at 66; see e.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 
2014) (holding that a law banning the provision of gay conversion therapy to minors 
by state-licensed mental health professionals regulated conduct, not protected speech, 
even though communication was involved), cert. denied, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4636. 
 239 As Erwin Chemerinsky has explained: “To deny First Amendment protection 
for [symbolic] forms of communication would mean a loss of some of the most 
effective means of communicative messages. Also, words are obviously symbols, and 
there is no reason why the First Amendment should be limited to protecting just these 
symbols to the exclusion of all others.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 226, at 1063; cf. 
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992) (“Where the government does not target 
conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation 
merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.”); BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, 
supra note 66, at 18 (“[W]e have to rethink the speech act in order to understand 
what is made and what is done by certain kinds of bodily enactments: the bodies 
assembled ‘say’ we are not disposable, even if they stand silently.”); id. at 45 (“It 
cannot be that agency is a specific power of speech, and that the speech act is the 
model of political action.”).  
 240 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 58, 70, 90 (2014) 
(explaining that “[d]ata communicates,” that one fact is often more persuasive than 
thousands of opinions, and that focusing on the government’s intent or motive for 
regulating a particular piece of data will shed light on whether the data is entitled to 
First Amendment protections).  
 241 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449 (2d Cir. 
2001) (concluding that computer code can warrant First Amendment protection).  
 242 See Benjamin, supra note 217, at 1458-71 (collecting Supreme Court authority 
suggesting that algorithm-based search engine results were protected speech); cf. 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (concluding that video 
games are protected by the First Amendment). For a contrasting view as to whether 
computer-generated communications are entitled to First Amendment coverage, see 
Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2013) (arguing that when 
data is operating merely as a functional communication tool or conduit, as opposed to 
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Moreover — and particularly relevant to efforts to obfuscate online 
activity, which sometime involve supplying inaccurate information — 
the Supreme Court recently suggested in United States v. Alvarez that 
even false speech is entitled to First Amendment protections.243 In that 
case, the Supreme Court held that the Stolen Valor Act, which 
criminalized false claims about having a military medal, was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.244 The Court specifically 
rejected the Government’s contention that “false statements generally 
should constitute a new category of unprotected speech” and, instead, 
suggested merely that the falsity of a statement could be relevant to 
the First Amendment analysis if the speech also fell within one of the 
other, less protected categories of speech.245 
Acts of performative privacy will often not fall into such categories. 
As the Court recounted in Alvarez, categories of less protected speech 
include speech inciting imminent lawless action, obscenity, 
defamation, fighting words, fraud, true threats, and child 
pornography.246 And these categories themselves are narrowly defined 
and subject to certain exceptions, which move the speech into the 
protected realm.247 Indeed, even when speech is so generally offensive, 
such as the speech by Westboro Baptist Church outside the funeral of 
a fallen Marine, which included signs such as “Thank God for Dead 
Soldiers,” the expression is entitled to robust First Amendment 
protections.248 
Further, while the Supreme Court has noted a broad number of 
goals served by the First Amendment, it has on multiple occasions 
emphasized that the First Amendment’s primary goal is the protection 
of political speech. As recently as 2011, the Court has held that “[t]he 
 
actually serving to curate content, the data is not “speech” covered by the First 
Amendment).  
 243 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2539-40 (2012).  
 244 See id. at 2543.  
 245 Id. at 2546-47; see also Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly 
Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (2015) (documenting 
when lies may be entitled to First Amendment protection); Helen Norton, Lies and the 
Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 171-72 (2012) (suggesting that regulation of lies 
should be limited by First Amendment interests in limiting the government’s ability to 
serve as the ultimate judge of truth).  
 246 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (collecting authority). For an important critique 
of whether the diminished protection provided to so-called low-value speech is 
supported by the First Amendment history, see Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of 
Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2182-92 (2015).  
 247 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544. 
 248 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S 443, 448, 458 (2011). 
  
1728 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:1673 
Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public 
matters.”249 As Part II demonstrated, acts of performative privacy are 
at their heart political in nature — statements of resistance to 
surveillance structures. 
Nor is it irrelevant to any consideration of the scope of protections 
afforded to performative privacy that the Supreme Court has long 
protected anonymous speech.250 Significantly, in Watchtower Bible & 
Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton, the Supreme Court held 
that the First Amendment’s protections for anonymous speech 
extended to invalidate an ordinance prohibiting canvassers from going 
onto private property to promote any cause unless they had first 
received a permit to do so, and the resident had not opted to display a 
“no solicitation” sign.251 The Court noted that the registration 
requirement “necessarily results in a surrender of anonymity” because 
the canvasser is identified in the application, which in turn is available 
for public inspection.252 Notwithstanding the fact that a canvasser 
known to a resident would “reveal their allegiance to a group or cause 
when they present themselves at the front door to advocate an issue or 
to deliver a handbill,” canvassers who were “strangers to the resident 
certainly maintain their anonymity” absent the registration 
requirement.253 The court directly rejected an appeal to infect the First 
Amendment with the third-party doctrine.254 It recognized the 
importance of practical anonymity when engaged in public expression. 
 
 249 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011); see also Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (characterizing political speech as “central to 
the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment”); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 
393, 403 (2007) (“Political speech, of course, is ‘at the core of what the First 
Amendment is designed to protect.’” (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 
(2003))); Black, 538 U.S. at 365 (explaining that conduct, including cross burning, 
can mean “that the person is engaged in core political speech”).  
 250 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) 
(“Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent 
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield 
from the tyranny of the majority.”); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) 
(overturning statute restricting the distribution of anonymous pamphlets because 
“[a]nonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an 
important role in the progress of [person]kind” and observing that “[p]ersecuted 
groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize 
oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all”).  
 251 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
154, 169 (2002).  
 252 Id. at 166.  
 253 Id. at 166-67. 
 254 See id. 
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Even upon entering the public realm to advocate a particular idea, the 
Court held that permitting the canvasser to remain anonymous (to the 
extent possible) was critical under the First Amendment.255 
Accordingly, depending on the context in which they arise, many of 
the acts of performative privacy discussed in Part II may be construed 
as expressive, political conduct entitled to First Amendment 
protections. In the context of the living history of state-sanctioned 
violence against black bodies, wearing a hoodie can be an attempt to 
maintain public anonymity and a statement of resistance against a 
surveilling, violent state. In the context of attempts to force trans 
people to publicly disclose intimate information in order to access 
public restrooms or participate on public sports teams, demands for 
privacy by trans people are performative expressions of their true 
gender identity. In the context of state and corporate efforts to strip 
Muslim women of their coverings, refusal to do so is not only a 
statement of religion, but can also serve as a responsive call for 
privacy/modesty in the face of public gaze. In the context of attempts 
to identify and intimidate peaceful, lawful protestors, the wearing of 
masks is an expressive refusal to succumb to the surveillance state.256 
Likewise, in the context of panoptic state and private surveillance of 
online activity, attempts to obfuscate cyber activity (in effect, donning 
a “cyber mask”) are also performative privacy acts.257 
Doctrinally, once these activities are deemed to include expressive 
conduct they become subject to the First Amendment’s protection, 
meaning that any attempt by the government to regulate the content 
of the expression is likely subject to strict scrutiny and any content-
neutral time, place, and manner restriction must nevertheless be 
 
 255 But see, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194-99 (2010) (recognizing the First 
Amendment interest in anonymously petitioning the government for a referendum, 
but concluding, as a general matter, that there is no First Amendment violation where 
the identity of petition signatories is publicly disclosed because of an overriding 
government interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process).  
 256 But see Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 
206-07 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding New York’s anti-mask law against First Amendment 
challenge and concluding that KKK’s desire to wear masks was not protected 
expressive conduct because it was “redundant” of the rest of the expression conveyed 
by the rest of the costume).  
 257 One may be concerned that requiring courts to determine whether these acts 
are entitled to First Amendment protection will require laborious individualized 
inquires. And that may be so, but courts are well-accustomed to making such First 
Amendment inquiries as it stands. Indeed, in the First Amendment context, even 
appellate courts are charged with examining the whole record and often scrutinize 
underlying facts as “ultimate” or so-called “constitutional” subject to de novo review. 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501, 504-05 (1984).  
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narrowly tailored and satisfy intermediate scrutiny.258 This is in 
contrast to the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy 
inquiry, which often amounts to little more than a balancing test tilted 
in favor of the government.259 In Alvarez, the Supreme Court 
reiterated its rejection of a balancing test for First Amendment claims, 
explaining that “a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . 
[based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits” 
would be “startling and dangerous.”260 
While case-by-case application of scrutiny is beyond the scope of 
this Article, many of the laws targeting acts of performative privacy 
would seem to fail such scrutiny.261 For example, bathroom bills that 
limit transgender individuals’ ability to express their gender identity 
by using the restrooms that correspond to that identity, are often 
specifically designed to restrict and punish gender expression.262 
Similarly, laws that specifically target hoodies for criminalization 
could be considered content-based limitations on the ability to express 
opposition to the state’s surveillance regime and the corresponding 
structural oppression of racial minorities. Nor is it doctrinally 
irrelevant, as then-Professor Elena Kagan pointed out,263 that many of 
 
 258 See supra note 210 (discussing level of scrutiny for First Amendment claims).  
 259 See Skinner-Thompson, Outing, supra note 29, at 196 n.208 (outlining Fourth 
Amendment balancing test).  
 260 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)). 
 261 This is not to say that there may never be legitimate government interests for 
regulating acts of public privacy or that law enforcement will be paralyzed. But instead 
of the Fourth Amendment’s milquetoast balancing test, those interests should be 
substantial or compelling. Nor is it to suggest that expressive conduct can never form 
the basis of reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, warranting further police 
investigation or arrest. People’s words and expression often function as evidence and 
serve as the basis for reasonable suspicion. But the expression must be suggestive of a 
crime and, as discussed with regard to Virginia v. Black, ex ante criminalization of 
particular communications is unconstitutional. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 
366-67 (2003). And nothing about maintaining one’s privacy — without more — is 
suggestive of criminal activity. See Joh, supra note 86, at 1002. 
 262 See Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060-A, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 491, at *10 (Oct. 
11, 2000) (concluding that a transgender female student’s desire to dress in female 
clothes was protected expressive conduct likely to be understood by others because 
“by dressing in clothing and accessories traditionally associated with the female 
gender, she is expressing her identification with that gender” and that the “plaintiff’s 
expression is not merely a personal preference but a necessary symbol of her very 
identity”).  
 263 See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive 
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (explaining that First 
Amendment doctrine “has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of 
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the attempts to regulate acts of performative privacy suggest that the 
government is itself motivated by an illicit attempt to target a 
particular message.264 As the Supreme Court just concluded in 
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, the First Amendment is implicated when 
the government intends to regulate a particular message, even if the 
regulated individual intended no such message and was engaged in no 
speech.265 
Importantly, the protection provided by the First Amendment is also 
not limited by the “secrecy paradigm” that would circumscribe 
arguments that these laws run afoul of traditional privacy protections. 
Village of Stratton makes that very clear.266 A comparison of how a law 
infringing on acts of performative privacy might fare under the Fourth 
Amendment and First Amendment helps illustrate the importance of 
avoiding the secrecy paradigm or third-party doctrine. For instance, 
consider a person subject to a bathroom bill requiring that they show 
their birth certificate to confirm that they were using the bathroom 
corresponding to their birth-assigned sex. If such a person challenged 
enforcement of the law under the Fourth Amendment, a court may 
conclude that because a transgender individual’s identity as trans was 
partially public (because they had shared that information with 
friends, or had already been forced to disclose that information by the 
government in other contexts), the individual therefore has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Conversely, under the First 
Amendment, individuals’ expressive efforts to resist attempts to surveil 
aspects of their anatomy when using a restroom would be protected as 
speech notwithstanding that aspects of their identity might be publicly 
available and accessible elsewhere.267 
 
improper governmental motives” and that the “doctrine comprises a series of tools to 
flush out illicit motives and to invalidate actions infected with them”); see also 
Bambauer, supra note 240, at 89 (suggesting that focusing on the motive behind state 
action can help shed light on whether data is subject to First Amendment regulation).  
 264 See supra Part II.B.  
 265 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016). 
 266 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
166 (2002); see also Kaminski, supra note 110, at 838 (observing that the Court in 
Stratton acknowledges “that anonymity may be contextual rather than absolute”).  
 267 As noted at several points, it is not this Article’s contention that all functional 
efforts to maintain privacy are necessarily expressive. But that point does not severely 
limit the doctrinal impact of the concept of performative privacy. Certainly, for those 
who do intend something expressive, they will likely be covered by the First 
Amendment. But to the extent that a government regulation is overly broad and 
regulates expressive and non-expressive conduct, the First Amendment’s overbreadth 
doctrine may still limit the regulation and provide privacy protections. See, e.g., 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481-82 (2010) (statute criminalizing the 
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As such, once conceptualized as acts of performative, expressive 
resistance, attempts to maintain privacy in public may fare better 
under the First Amendment’s protections for expressive conduct than 
under traditional Fourth Amendment privacy protections,268 which 
have been severely hamstrung by doctrines such as the third-party 
doctrine.269 
 
creation, sale, or purchase of depictions of animal cruelty was overbroad under the 
First Amendment).  
 268 It is worth noting that by embracing the First Amendment as a means of 
advancing privacy protections, this Article might be accused of contributing to what 
some, such as Paul Carrington, have dubbed the “imperial First Amendment.” See 
Paul D. Carrington, Our Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1167, 1209-10 
(2001). And to what others have deemed First Amendment Lochnerism, whereby the 
First Amendment is used to strike down otherwise valid and commonplace 
government regulations. See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: 
Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 421, 433, 457 (2006) 
(outlining purported regulatory risks associated with so-called “First Amendment 
Lochnerism,” but concluding that the phrase cuts off discussion). While sensitive to 
this concern, my sense is that the concept of performative privacy is much more 
modest in its formulation of what constitutes protected “speech” than say, for 
example, cases which identify pure data as speech or corporations as speakers. In 
short, while wary of an imperial First Amendment, the concept of performative 
privacy does not dramatically expand doctrine. Instead, performative privacy fits more 
squarely with traditional notions of expressive conduct, as outlined in this Part.  
Relatedly, there may be concern that this Article’s structural relationship approach 
to expression unwittingly buttresses expression-based defenses to LGBT anti-
discrimination ordinances by, for example, wedding photographers or florists, who 
argue that by being forced to participate in gay weddings they are being compelled to 
express a particular view. But there are important differences. First, it is unclear that 
taking photographs or baking a cake compels embrace of any message, unlike Hurley 
and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2010), where groups 
purportedly dedicated to an expressive association were implicated. See Elane 
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 65-66 (N.M. 2013) (“The United States 
Supreme Court has never found a compelled-speech violation arising from the 
application of antidiscrimination laws to a for-profit public accommodation.”). 
Second, the compelling government interest of ensuring LGBT equality likely 
outweighs any purported speech interest, even assuming it exists. See Erwin 
Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 595, 596 (2001) (arguing that Dale was flawed, in part, because it failed to 
recognize the compelling interest in achieving equality and because it took an overly 
narrow view of the Scouts’ expressive message).  
 269 While less direct, the concept of performative privacy also has doctrinal 
implications for tort law which could be used to limit corporate surveillance. As 
discussed in Part I.A, tort claims for invasion of privacy against a private corporation 
are hampered by the secrecy paradigm/third-party doctrine. But to the extent 
performative privacy helps change societal norms regarding what is reasonably 
regarded as private, it can increase the sphere of protected space deemed “private” 
under tort jurisprudence.  
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B. Discursive Implications 
In addition to providing stronger doctrinal protections for public 
privacy demands, conceptualizing acts of public privacy as expressive 
also has the potential to help alter how efforts to maintain public 
privacy are perceived by American society. I analyze several potential 
discursive, societal benefits to understanding privacy as performative/
expressive. 
1. From Suspicion to Embrace 
As it stands, certain privacy-supplementing acts, such as wearing a 
hoodie, head veil, mask, or demanding gender privacy, are viewed 
with suspicion. As outlined in Part II.B, there are examples of laws, 
policies, or bills specifically targeting each of these activities,270 
reflecting at least some level of discomfort with these practices by 
certain portions of the populace. 
But while many view acts of public privacy as suspicious — 
influenced by the inaccurate adage that those who seek privacy have 
something to hide271 — freedom of expression maintains broad and 
deep support among the American public.272 In fact, in a 2013 survey, 
nearly half (47%) of those surveyed identified freedom of speech as 
the single most important freedom citizens enjoy.273 The runner-up — 
freedom of religion — was selected by only 10% of those surveyed.274 
As such, there is reason to believe that if acts of public privacy are 
 
 270 See, e.g., H.B. 663, 2016 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (“Local school 
boards shall develop and implement policies that require every school restroom, 
locker room, or shower room that is designated for use by a specific gender to solely 
be used by individuals whose anatomical sex matches such gender designation.”).  
 271 For example, in 2009, Google CEO Eric Schmidt remarked that “[i]f you have 
something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in 
the first place.” Richard Esguerra, Google CEO Eric Schmidt Dismisses the Importance of 
Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 10, 2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2009/12/google-ceo-eric-schmidt-dismisses-privacy (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).  
 272 See, e.g., FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 2014 (2014), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/State-of-
the-First-Amendment-2014-report-06-24-14.pdf (reflecting that relatively consistently 
since 1997 a large majority of Americans express support for the First Amendment, 
with most disagreeing that the First Amendment goes too far in protecting rights 
(though in recent years, the number of those agreeing that the First Amendment goes 
too far has increased)).  
 273 FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 2013 2 (2013), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/SOFA-
2013-final-report.pdf.  
 274 Id.  
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framed less as defensive efforts for secrecy, and more as affirmative 
acts of expression, they may be viewed more receptively by American 
society. 
Changing social attitudes towards acts of public privacy may be just 
as important for providing doctrinal protections for those acts and 
could go a long way in reducing societal violence against those 
engaged in acts of public privacy. In other words, if a hoodie is viewed 
as an exercise of the cherished right to expression rather than a 
defensive attempt at concealment, law enforcement officials and 
private individuals alike may hesitate before engaging in violence and 
aggression against those who wear a hoodie. As a concept, 
performative privacy could help change the starting point for any 
conversation regarding public privacy from one of suspicion to one of 
sympathy or even embrace. As others have explained, “[h]ow we name 
[a] struggle seems to matter very much, given that sometimes a 
movement is deemed antidemocratic, even terrorist, and on other 
occasions or in other contexts, the same movement is understood as a 
popular effort to realize a more inclusive and substantive 
democracy.”275 The same holds true for efforts to maintain privacy. 
Privacy has been deemed suspicious — but it could be understood as 
the expressive articulation of a desire to be free.276 
2. From Inward to Outward 
Equally important, even when demands for privacy are not viewed 
as raising a red flag of suspicion and are viewed “positively,” privacy 
has nevertheless been critiqued as inward-looking, conservative, and 
potentially self-oppressive. For example, framing women’s abortion 
rights277 or rights to contraception278 as rights to privacy has been 
critiqued as rhetorically reinforcing Victorian values that relegate 
women to the private sphere — the home — which, in turn, is often a 
 
 275 BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note 66, at 2.  
 276 See COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF, supra note 11, at 125 (“The way 
that we talk about privacy shapes our understanding of what it is — and what it is 
not.”); Woodrow Hartzog, The Fight to Frame Privacy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1021-
26 (2013) (reviewing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF 
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011) and highlighting that how privacy is framed 
influences how its viewed by audiences).  
 277 E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); cf. Scott Skinner-Thompson et al., 
Marriage, Abortion, and Coming Out, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 126, 148 (2016) 
(observing that “respect for women’s reproductive choices, like respect for consensual 
same-sex sexual relations, is rooted in respect for decisional privacy”). 
 278 E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).  
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site of oppression and even violence against women.279 Similarly, 
efforts to advance lesbian and gay rights through a privacy lens280 have 
been questioned as suggesting that there is something shameful about 
non-heteronormative sexual identities.281 From this perspective, 
privacy has been criticized as a demand to remain in the “closet.”282 
Broadly speaking, demands for privacy rights often appear inward 
looking or pre-political.283 And even those that advance public privacy 
with reliance on its instrumental benefits feed into the notion that 
privacy is, in fact, inward looking and pre-political, serving merely as 
an incubator for later public thought.284 
Performative privacy alters the conceptual landscape and helps us 
understand that efforts to maintain privacy — refusals of the 
surveillance gaze — are in fact outward facing political acts that are 
public exercises of an individual’s agency.285 Privacy does not simply 
 
 279 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 
100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311 (1991) (“The problem is that while the private has been a 
refuge for some, it has been a hellhole for others, often at the same time. In gendered 
light, the law’s privacy is a sphere of sanctified isolation, impunity, and 
unaccountability.”). 
 280 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 567 (2003) (holding a Texas 
statute forbidding same-sex sexual conduct unconstitutional because adults are free to 
engage in “private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).  
 281 See generally Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM L. REV. 
1431, 1455 (1992) (suggesting that the problem with privacy as a foundation for 
lesbian and gay rights is, in part, that the closet is “less a refuge than a prisonhouse” 
that helps perpetuate heterosexual privilege). 
 282 See, e.g., Cathy A. Harris, Note, Outing Privacy Litigation: Toward a Contextual 
Strategy for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 248, 265 (1997) (arguing 
that “[t]he implication [of privacy protections for one’s sexuality] is that gay and 
lesbian sexuality must be shrouded in a secrecy/privacy veil, and that disclosure of 
one’s aberrant sexuality by a third party is a legal harm that warrants a legal 
remedy”). But see, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT 
Plaintiffs, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1711, 1764 (2010) (observing that as long as intolerance 
against LGBT individuals persists, privacy rights will remain an important protection 
for non-normative sexualities).  
 283 Cf. BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note 66, at 206 (questioning whether the fact that 
the “private sphere becomes the very background of public action” suggests 
necessarily that it should “for that reason be cast as prepolitical”).  
 284 See, e.g., Richards, Dangers, supra note 51, at 1945-46 (“Intellectual-privacy 
theory suggests that new ideas often develop best away from the intense scrutiny of 
public exposure.”). 
 285 Cf. Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 
303, 308 (2010) (stating that the Fourth Amendment “protects a political ‘right of the 
people’ to organize community life free from pervasive government surveillance and 
interference”). 
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serve as an incubator, creating space for subsequent political 
expression (though it does do that). It is more than just a passive 
virtue — it is frequently an exercise and expression of power. Privacy 
is not pre-political — it is political.286 In this way, the concept of 
performative privacy can also help turn the First Amendment into a 
sword for privacy rights; whereas currently the First Amendment is 
often used to limit regulatory enforcement of privacy under the belief 
that limiting the exchange of (private) information is limiting the 
exchange of speech.287 
When a transgender person refuses to show their “papers” in order 
to access the bathroom that corresponds with their true gender 
identity, they are not hiding in the closet, but instead are expressing a 
political message and living their agency.288 The same holds true for 
those who use encryption or wear a hoodie to subvert public 
surveillance.289 And this discursive implication — this way of thinking 
 
 286 Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 783-84 (1989) 
(arguing that, at least in the abortion context, privacy should be viewed as curtailing 
the state’s authority to mandate conformity rather than as cabining areas where the 
government may not restrict our activity). Relatedly, by understanding that privacy 
demands are outward facing and not merely pre-political, the concept of performative 
privacy can help destabilize gendered conceptions of privacy as “feminine” and, 
correspondingly, of “feminine” as inward and passive. Cf. Rich, supra note 99, at 
1047-49 (noting that police surveillance is understood and socialized as a form of 
white masculinity and domination).  
 287 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The 
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1049, 1051-52 (2000) (arguing that First Amendment doctrine makes it difficult 
to stop dissemination of private information and that efforts to change this would 
have unfortunate consequences); cf. AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW 
PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE PRESS (2015) (making a similar argument 
with regard to privacy and the freedom of the press). 
 288 Significantly, while certain acts of performative privacy may rely on the act of 
obfuscation being visible, at the same time they refuse the regulatory regime’s power 
to recognize, or constitute, the actor. Cf. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 61, at 4; 
see also MCGRATH, supra note 60, at 77 (while advocating for performance critiques of 
surveillance, explaining that “we should not fall into the representational trap of 
equating value with exposure to view”).  
 289 To the extent regimes are surveilling for particular purposes — for particular 
information — overwhelming self-exposure or inundation can also be a form of 
resistance. Kirstie Ball, Exposure, 12 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 639, 653 (2009). Similarly, 
the Surveillance Camera Players, who perform plays critical of surveillance regimes in 
front of CCTV surveillance cameras, highlight another form of performative resistance 
to surveillance regime that is based on being seen — not remaining private. See 
MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 137-39 (describing the Surveillance Camera Players and 
other forms of counter surveillance resistance as publicly challenging institutional 
agents of surveillance); see also MCGRATH, supra note 60, at 208-09 (describing 
examples of surveillance performance/critique that are based on creatively flaunting 
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about privacy — may, in turn, have doctrinal effects because it can 
help both society and the courts better appreciate privacy’s value, the 
weight of which is historically underappreciated relative to other 
societal concerns (namely, security).290 
Relatedly, to the extent that the concept of performative privacy 
isolates, labels, and identifies certain arguably quotidian tasks as 
privacy-enhancing, it could help shape where we locate the battle lines 
between the public and private sphere. As discussed, the state and 
corporate actors are continually expanding what is deemed “public” 
and therefore subject to regulation. Expanded surveillance erodes 
societal expectations of privacy, and expands what is subject to 
regulation in the public sphere. Consequently, surveilled “public” 
space is no longer for the people, the body politic — but is instead a 
space where the state and corporate interests have unchecked control. 
Conversely, private space is for the individual, and individuals 
collectively, as a public. 
What, then, of performative privacy? Performative privacy helps us 
understand that efforts are being made to lay claim to purportedly 
“public” space by refusing to be surveilled, and keeping that space for 
one’s self. It recognizes that efforts are being made to push back the 
encroaching front line of the “public” sphere.291 
This discursive, conceptual implication, too, has a potential legal 
impact, even assuming no change in the conservative, limited 
protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. Because Fourth 
Amendment protections for privacy continue to hinge on where there 
is an expectation of privacy society is prepared to recognize as 
“reasonable,”292 the concept of performative privacy helps us identify 
 
surveillance). But, in my view, acts of performative privacy are even more powerful 
than efforts to ape surveillance because performative privacy acts maintain integrity 
and fidelity to the value they are designed to protect — privacy or anonymity — 
instead of potentially surrendering one’s identity.  
 290 See SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 2 (“Privacy often loses out to security when it 
shouldn’t. Security interests are readily understood, for life and limb are at stake, 
while privacy rights remain more abstract and vague.”).  
 291 Cf. BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note 66, at 75 (describing how public occupation 
efforts “exercise the performative power to lay claim to the public”); see also Scott 
Skinner-Thompson, The Right to the Public Square: Hoodies, Head Veils & Bathrooms, 
MUFTAH (Mar. 23, 2017), http://muftah.org/right-public-square-hoodies-head-veils-
bathrooms/ (discussing the relationship between public privacy and participatory 
democracy).  
 292 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(concluding that an individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in an 
enclosed telephone booth).  
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certain acts as privacy-enhancing, as laying claim to certain spaces as 
“private,” and, therefore, reasonably entitled to legal protection.293 
3. From Silos to Universality 
Finally, to the degree that performative demands for privacy are 
made by many marginalized groups including racial, religious, and 
sexual minorities, as well as socio-economically marginalized people, 
the concept of performative privacy has the potential to serve as a 
unifying organizing principle across identity-based movements. This is 
not to suggest that movements should not continue to foreground how 
discrimination and surveillance are often motivated by engrained 
structural animus against minority groups. Nor am I suggesting that 
performative privacy could serve as a panacea to all the social 
problems afflicting various minority groups, or that minority groups 
are the only ones targeted for surveillance. Indeed, as John Gilliom 
and others have powerfully demonstrated, socio-economically 
depressed groups, including white working people, are subjected to 
vast privacy invasions by the government into their homes and 
personal lives in return for government benefits.294 And workers of all 
stripes are subjected to surveillance by their employers.295 But the 
range of those impacted by surveillance underscores how the concept 
of performative privacy may foreground how different marginalized 
people are all targeted by state and private surveillance regimes (to 
differing degrees and in differing ways). This, at the very least could 
help such groups recognize the shared aspects of their struggles and, 
somewhat more ambitiously, provide a legal/social project around 
which to collectively organize. As Butler notes, “identity politics fails 
to furnish a broader conception of what it means, politically, to live 
together, across differences, sometimes in modes of unchosen 
proximity.”296 More particularly, and as an example, Butler has 
criticized feminists who support the right of transgender individuals to 
appear in public as they desire, but simultaneously supported 
 
 293 See Joh, supra note 86, at 1023 (arguing that “privacy protests can demonstrate 
the shifting boundaries of privacy norms”). 
 294 See generally GILLIOM, supra note 55 (examining welfare surveillance regimes 
from the perspective of low-income mothers in Appalachia). 
 295 See, e.g., Karen E.C. Levy, The Contexts of Control: Information, Power, and 
Truck-Driving Work, 31 THE INFO. SOC’Y 160 (2015) (documenting industry 
surveillance of blue collar truck drivers).  
 296 BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note 66, at 27; see also id. at 50 (“[T]he struggle to 
form alliances is paramount, and it involves a plural and performative positing of 
eligibility where it did not exist before.”).  
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restrictions on head veils in the name of secular universalism.297 And 
while identity-based claims remain of critical importance, 
performative privacy helps illustrate a more plural conception of 
rights, and how they can be exercised.298 
Further, to the extent that identity-based claims tend 
(unfortunately) to be viewed skeptically by both American society and 
the courts,299 framing issues of targeted surveillance against racial, 
religious, and sexual minorities in terms of performative privacy and 
freedom of expression has the potential to provide a more universal 
and coalescing normative response to these conflicts. 
CONCLUSION 
In response to aggressive surveillance regimes by the government 
and private sector, many individuals engage in acts of performative 
privacy — expressive demands for privacy in public that communicate 
a refusal to be surveilled. Conceptualizing such functional demands 
for public privacy as expressive acts has doctrinal and social 
implications. Doctrinally, as expressive conduct, such acts may be 
entitled to strict First Amendment protections and be given more 
weight relative to the security concerns that often trump privacy’s 
indirect benefits — benefits that currently dominate theoretical 
conceptions of public privacy’s value. Discursively, linking demands 
for privacy with the broadly-supported freedom of expression may 
engender societal acceptance of acts of performative privacy, while 
also shifting rhetorical norms on the dividing line between public and 
private. At the same time, to the extent acts of performative privacy 
traverse many different marginalized communities, the concept has 
the potential to help us better appreciate the commonality of our 
struggles against social structures that maintain control, in part, 
through the surveillance of marginalized bodies. 
 
 297 See id. at 49-50. This critique is, of course, not isolated at any particular group. 
As Torin Monahan and others have observed, the narrow focus of many groups — 
including those focused on privacy concerns — has stunted meaningful coalition 
building. See MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 143.  
 298 That said, in order to avoid re-enshrining certain identity categories, efforts at 
coalition politics should be open to “an emerging and unpredictable assemblage of 
positions,” not assume the content of any particular identity, and leave space for the 
annunciation of distinct identity. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 61, at 20.  
 299 See Yoshino, supra note 203, at 751-55 (noting the pluralism anxiety of 
American society and courts and the increased skepticism to claims framed in terms of 
group-based identity politics).  
